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Summary
Recent years have seen a revival of expropriations in the resource sector, which
was long believed to be a phenomenon of the 1970s when oil prices surged.
This thesis investigates the effect of expropriation risk on the extraction de-
cisions by mineral producers. Expropriation risk likely has different effects
on extraction depending on the capital intensity of the resource, because of
two effects that work in opposite directions: (i) expropriation risk tends to
depress investments, which leads to lower capital–reserve ratios, ultimately
giving higher marginal costs and slower extraction; (ii) expropriation risk in-
duces mine owners to extract faster, because it decreases the expected value
of the unexploited resource stock. I label these opposing effects the ex ante
and ex post effects, respectively, reflecting that the two effects are results of
decisions made before and after investment. The ex ante effect is arguably
stronger the more capital-intensive the resource is, so the direction of the total
effect is theoretically ambiguous, making it an empirical matter to determine
how extraction rates are affected by expropriation risk.
The topic of this thesis is related to the literature on the resource curse,
in which the quality of institutions have been pointed out as one of the key
factors. Rent seeking has been proposed as an important mechanism through
which the curse works, and the effect of expropriation risk on investment and
extraction decisions is another possible mechanism—countries that are unable
to efficiently exploit their natural resources will underperform relative to their
endowments.
An increasing number of theoretical papers on expropriation risk and re-
source extraction have introduced investments in capital into the framework.
However, while the theoretical literature on the subject is vast, the empiri-
cal evidence is wanting. Most empirical papers are concentrated mainly on
deforestation and environmental issues related to this. Others have com-
pared deforestation to oil production, the latter of which is relatively more
capital-intensive, showing positive and negative effects of expropriation risk
on extraction, respectively. I argue that in order to investigate whether cap-
ital intensity determines the effect of expropriation risk, we need to examine
resources that are similar in most regards, but differ in terms of capital in-
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tensity. Non-fluent minerals, specifically iron and coal, seem to satisfy this
requirement.
In a theoretical section I provide some intuition for how expropriation risk
is thought to distort investment and extraction decisions, and discuss implica-
tions of reserves being endogenous to this risk. The impact on different types
of investments is also discussed, and I argue that there is likely a difference
in short run and long run effects of expropriation risk. Because investments
take time to materialize, and institutions tend to be persistent, the ex ante
effect should be more pronounced between countries than within countries.
The empirical analysis is done in two steps, using time-series data from
1,579 iron and coal mines in 46 countries, and a variable describing expropri-
ation risk. The first and preliminary step is to compare average investment–
output ratios of iron and two types of coal. I find that (i) bituminous coal
is more capital-intensive than other types of coal, (ii) iron is more capital-
intensive than non-bituminous coal, and (iii) there are indications of iron also
being more capital-intensive than bituminous coal. Second, this information
is applied in an econometric model which separates the effect of expropriation
risk on the three minerals.
Results from a pooled OLS regression show that extraction rates of all
three minerals respond negatively to expropriation risk, but that the effect is
stronger for bituminous coal and iron, the latter showing the strongest effect.
This is consistent with what we would expect from the relative capital inten-
sities of the minerals. The effects are quite large: A one standard deviation
increase in the expropriation risk index is expected to give 44 %, 37 % and
24 % decreases in iron, bituminous coal and non-bituminous coal extraction
rates, respectively. This emphasizes the importance of good property rights
institutions in countries with large natural resource endowments. The results
from the OLS regression withstand a number of robustness tests, although
the difference in effects between iron and bituminous coal seems less robust.
Random and fixed effects regressions are also applied, the latter initially giv-
ing significant, but puzzling results, which turn out to be driven by Chinese
mines. Generally, however, within-country variations in expropriation risk
may be too small for a fixed effects estimation to make sense.
My findings provide support to previous empirical investigations, that the
response of extraction rates to expropriation risk is decreasing in capital in-
tensity. However, my models have low explanatory power, indicating that
there is a lot of variation explained by omitted variables. This motivates a
discussion of some extensions of my analysis, and alternative approaches to
the same problem.
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1 | Introduction
“Nationalize the iron briquette sector, there is nothing to
discuss.”
Hugo Chavez
The above quote is from a televised speech regarding the nationalization
of the Venezuelan iron and steel sector in 2009 (Reuters, 2009). During his
fourteen years as president of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez expropriated some
1,100 companies, a number of them in the natural resource sector (Goldhaber,
2013). Though long believed to be mainly a phenomenon of the 70s, in recent
years countries like Russia (2006, 2007), Bolivia (2006), China (2006), Algeria
(2006) and Argentina (2012) have also seen expropriations in the resource
sector (Christensen, 2011; Romero & Minder, 2012; van Benthem & Stroebel,
2010); still, there is little empirical evidence of how risk of expropriation affects
the exploitation of natural resources.
This thesis aims to explain—and provide empirical evidence for—the be-
havior of mining companies who face expropriation risk. More specifically,
I examine how mineral extraction rates differ between different levels of ex-
propriation risk. Conventional resource economics theory holds that higher
expropriation risk leads to more rapid production; intuitively, mine owners
have incentives to extract as much as possible before the resource is seized by
the authorities.1 This can more formally be derived from Hotelling’s (1931)
famous paper on optimal non-renewable resource extraction, in which the dis-
count rate generally represents uncertainty about the future. He argues that
an increase in the discount rate will result in extraction being shifted towards
the present, and the resource being depleted at an earlier time. More explicit
support for this view is found in e.g. Long (1975), and implicit support is
found in most of the literature on the optimal extraction of natural resources
(e.g. Perman, Ma, Common, Maddison, & McGilvray, 2011).
1Note that ‘mine owner’ in this thesis refers to both (i) legal owners of a resource deposit
and (ii) companies with contractual leasing rights to resource deposits that are owned by
the state.
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However, although the simplest Hotelling-type models give useful insight
into some of the dynamics of resource extraction under uncertainty, they
arguably do not tell the whole story. More specifically, they do not suffi-
ciently take into account the fact that most non-renewable resources are highly
capital-intensive, with large investments in exploration and capital equipment
needed before extraction can begin (see e.g. Campbell, 1980). Furthermore,
expropriation risk has been shown to significantly depress investment (Asiedu,
Jin, & Nandwa, 2009; Knack & Keefer, 1995). Production likely depends pos-
itively on investments in mining capital, so the effect of expropriation risk on
resource extraction is theoretically ambiguous.
Bohn and Deacon (2000) attempt to empirically disambiguate these effects
for oil and deforestation, and provide evidence for the effect of expropriation
risk being negative for oil and positive for deforestation, attributing it to the
fact that oil is a lot more capital-intensive. They tell a convincing story, and
their empirical results are not easily dismissed; however, the evidence for the
less capital-intensive resource is not as compelling. For example, deforestation
in developing countries is mostly linked to land clearing and firewood for
households rather than industrial forestry. My claim is therefore that the
positive relationship between expropriation risk and deforestation may have
other causes than low capital intensity. That is to say, I believe in the theory
behind the results in Bohn and Deacon (2000), but I argue that there is room
for more empirical evidence.
In this thesis I will provide further empirical support of Bohn and Deacon’s
theory, by using data on iron and coal production.2 The discussion will revolve
around two distinct features of resource extraction under expropriation risk,
which I call the ex ante and ex post effects. The former is the investment
depressing effect of expropriation risk, while the latter is the “rushing” effect
an increase in expropriation risk has on extraction from existing mines. The
main idea is that if the resource is sufficiently capital-intensive, the ex ante
effect will dominate the ex post effect, causing extraction to be slower under
risk of expropriation.
The empirical analysis compares the effects of expropriation risk on iron,
bituminous coal and non-bituminous coal. I use mine-level data on invest-
ments relative to average production value to show that iron is more capital-
intensive than coal in general, and that bituminous coal is more capital-
intensive than non-bituminous coal, which is consistent with what other pa-
pers have found (Creamer, Dobrovolsky, Borenstein, & Bernstein, 1960; Topp,
Soames, Parham, & Bloch, 2008). This information is used to specify an
econometric model where the effects on these three minerals are singled out.
2Extraction and production refer to the same thing, and are used interchangeably in
this thesis.
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Pooled OLS regressions confirm the theoretical predictions; extraction rates
of all minerals are affected negatively by expropriation risk, but more so for
the more capital-intensive minerals iron and bituminous coal. A one standard
deviation increase in the expropriation risk index is expected to give 44 %,
37 % and 24 % decreases in iron, bituminous coal and non-bituminous coal
extraction rates, respectively, so the estimated effects are large. This implies
that expropriation risk has a substantial economic impact through its effect
on natural resource exploitation.
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the
theoretical intuition on which this thesis builds. It presents the conventional
theory of resource extraction under uncertainty in more detail, gives an insight
into opposing views, and presents arguments for why there is need for more
empirical evidence. In the same section I also explain in more detail the ex
ante and ex post effects. The data used in the empirical analysis is described in
section 3, along with a discussion of the index of expropriation risk used in the
regressions. Chapter 4 describes my empirical strategy, which involves making
distinctions between minerals with respect to capital intensity, and explaining
how this is information is coupled with expropriation risk in the econometric
model. Chapter 5 presents the empirical results, along with a discussion of the
findings and proposals for further research, and finally chapter 6 concludes.3
3The investment–output comparisons in section 4.1.2 and the empirical analysis in chap-
ter 5 are done in Stata 12 MP.
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2 | Theory
This chapter is intended to give some insight in the theory of resource extrac-
tion under uncertainty, how it has been tested empirically, as well as how the
link from theory to empirics can be improved on. Section 2.1 gives some moti-
vation for why the matter at hand is interesting, relates it to the resource curse
literature, and discusses possible implications and economic consequences of
the effect of expropriation risk on resource extraction. Section 2.2 provides
a quick overview of the traditional theory, while section 2.3 discusses how
economists have attempted incorporate capital investments into the models.
The need for more empirical evidence of these theories is discussed in section
2.4, and section 2.5 discusses the ex ante and ex post effects in more detail.
2.1 Motivational Background
The specific focus in this thesis can in some sense be seen as a sidestep from
the main-stream literature on the so called ‘Resource Curse’, a term for the
apparent negative relationship between resource endowment and economic
performance (see e.g. Sachs & Warner, 1995; Boschini, Pettersson, & Roine,
2007; Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006a, 2006b; Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2008;
van der Ploeg, 2011). The main body of this literature is concerned with why
and under which circumstances resource rich countries seem to perform worse
than other countries in terms of growth and GDP levels. Mehlum et al. (2006a,
2006b) for example, argue that the presence of a resource curse depends on
the initial quality of institutions. If a country’s institutions are good enough,
the resource curse is turned to a resource blessing. Their focus is specifically
on the end results of the impact of institutions on growth through resource
abundance, and propose rent seeking as the underlying mechanism.
The literature on natural resource extraction and expropriation risk de-
scribes a second mechanism through which resource-rich economies can differ
in terms of development; namely, whether resources are exploited efficiently
or inefficiently. That is, this literature is not concerned with differentiating
between abundance and scarcity of natural resources, but attempts to explain
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the dynamics of extraction under risk. In section 2.3 and 2.5 I present reasons
for why expropriation risk might lead resources to be extracted too fast or too
slow, depending on capital intensity. This may have implications for research
on related subjects. For example, if extraction is too slow, the measure of
abundance used in most of the resource curse literature—natural resource ex-
ports to GDP—will tend to underestimate the true resource abundance; that
is, true resource abundance will not be accurately reflected in the value of
exports, because extraction is inefficiently slow.1 Other authors argue that
natural resource exports to GDP is a measure of resource dependence, rather
than abundance. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), for example, propose to
use a measure of known or probable reserves instead; however, this may also
be misleading, because this measure of reserves is likely to be endogenous to
expropriation risk (consult section 2.5.2).
Several economic consequences of sub-optimal extraction rates can be hy-
pothesized. For example, a country with high expropriation risk and large
endowments of resources that are capital-intensive, but economically viable
under normal circumstances, may never be able to exploit that resource at a
substantial rate until property rights become more secure. Moreover, if prop-
erty rights are more insecure in the resource sector than anywhere else (see
e.g. Poelhekke & Van der Ploeg, 2010), there is likely to be a misallocation
of capital, labor and other production inputs, implying that the economy as
a whole will be inefficient. In countries where the resource sector is large
relative to the rest of the economy, the inefficiencies may be substantial. If
there is expropriation risk in all sectors, investments in the resource sector
might not be lower than anywhere else, but the resource rents are likely to
give inefficiently high consumption (Konrad, Olsen, & Schöb, 1994), resulting
in intergenerational inequity (Hartwick, 1977).
2.2 Theoretical Background
A great number of modern economic models for exhaustible resources build on
the early work by Hotelling (1931), a paper that was somewhat unrecognized
by his contemporaries, but received renewed interest in the 1970s. His main
result was that, under very simplifying assumptions, the time and price path
of resource extraction will be determined by the discount rate, in his paper
equal to the interest rate. Socially efficient extraction requires that the growth
rate of the resource price be equal to the discount rate in all periods. More
specifically, he showed that optimal extraction will be strictly decreasing over
1This is assuming that the resource sector is more sensitive to expropriation risk than
the general economy.
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time. If the discount rate should exceed price growth, extraction will be shifted
towards the present—selling the resource and putting the money in the bank
is more profitable than leaving the resource in the ground and waiting for
higher prices.
We can distinguish between the private or subjective discount rate and
society’s discount rate. Society’s discount rate might include the interest
rate plus a preference for intergenerational (in-)equity. A high discount rate
may thus reflect a heavier weighting of the current generation than future
generations in the social planner’s problem. The private discount rate can be
thought of as the risk-free interest rate plus any risk premium investors might
require. Expropriation risk will likely increase this risk premium, giving a
higher discount rate. Thus in the event of an increase in expropriation risk, it
can be derived from Hotelling (1931) that higher extraction rates and faster
depletion will result. If individual firms operate with subjective discount rates,
higher than society’s discount rate, resources will be depleted inefficiently fast.
These ideas are more explicitly dealt with in Long (1975), in which na-
tionalization with or without compensation is the source of uncertainty. He
investigates several different scenarios, with differing assumptions about the
discount rate and profit function. One of these scenarios is a situation where
neither the actual occurrence nor the timing of a potential nationalization is
known with certainty. Long shows that, assuming no compensation for ex-
propriated property, and compared to a case with no risk: (i) extraction in
the first period is higher, (ii) resource depletion is faster, (iii) extraction in
the last period of both the certainty and the uncertainty case is equal, (iv)
the two extraction paths intersect somewhere between the first and the last
period of extraction.
Konrad et al. (1994) provide further support for this view, but introduce
a notion of alternative investment opportunities, which they call ‘Swiss bank
accounts’. They look at a case in which a dictator owns the resource, and
insecurity is related to the risk of a coup. If the resource sector is more insecure
than the rest of the economy, we are in the Long (1975) case. Interestingly,
if all investment opportunities in the economy are equally insecure, resource
extraction will be according to the optimal Hotelling-rule. The efficiency
result ultimately depends on whether the Swiss bank account of the dictator
remains in her hands after the coup; however, even in the case where resource
extraction is socially efficient, the total investment share of GDP is too low,
and the consumption share is too high, so the economy as a whole is inefficient.
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2.3 Mineral Extraction and Investments
The models in the papers presented in section 2.2 are based on a number
of simplifying assumptions, and do not treat an important feature of many
exhaustible resources: they require large investments, often up-front, to be
extracted. Expropriation risk has been shown to have a detrimental effect
on economy-wide investment (Knack & Keefer, 1995; Asiedu et al., 2009;
Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005), and this is likely to be true also for the resource
sector, perhaps even more so. If there are no investments, there can be no
production, or this production is at best highly inefficient and primitive, and
extraction will be low relative to reserves.2 Even if exploration has been
done successfully, and deposits of a resource are well known, exploitation
of this resource requires someone to be willing to risk their capital to start
production.
The idea that capital intensity is important for the dynamics of resource
extraction is not new. Campbell (1980) looks at how capacity constraints and
capital investments affect the optimal time-path of extraction, but does not
explicitly deal with uncertainty. He concludes that with capital investments—
all up-front—optimal extraction is constant over most of the lifetime of a mine,
contrary to the decreasing path in Hotelling (1931). Olsen (1987) extends the
models of Long (1975) and Campbell, and shows that in a model with capacity
investments, higher uncertainty does not in general result in the extraction
being shifted towards the present. If the resource stock is sufficiently large,
both investments and extraction will be lower than in the risk-free case (see
also Farzin, 1984). It is interesting to note that Olsen shows that it may be
optimal to spread out investments over the lifetime of a mine, depending on
the level and nature of uncertainty. A similar and related conclusion is reached
in Lasserre (1982), in which the speed of extraction responds negatively to an
increase in the discount rate if the economy is scarce in capital, relative to
the natural resource endowment. Peterson (1978) argues that higher discount
rates will tend to decrease extraction in the long run, because it discourages
investments in exploration.
2.4 Current Empirical Evidence
The empirical evidence on natural resource use under risk of expropriation is
very scarce, and is mostly related to deforestation. Deacon (1999) shows that
2A term for this type of production is artisanal or small-scale mining, which relies
mainly on labor input, and is common in many developing countries. This type of mining
is outside the scope of this thesis, as production data is nearly impossible to get hold of.
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deforestation rates are generally higher when expropriation risk is high, and
Barbier, Damania, and Leonard (2005) demonstrate a similar relationship
between level of corruption and deforestation. Ferreira and Vincent (2010)
point out that there is a difference between deforestation and industrial timber
harvesting, and show that commercial logging is decreasing in governance
quality only if governance is strong to begin with; however, if governance is
weak, improvements in governance increases timber harvests.
As far as I am aware, Bohn and Deacon (2000) are the first to empirically
test whether capital intensity determines how expropriation risk affects ex-
traction rates. They argue that the effect of expropriation risk (they call it
ownership risk) is theoretically ambiguous and that it depends on the capi-
tal intensity of the resource.3 Their rationale is that although expropriation
risk tends to speed up extraction from existing mineral operations, it also
decreases the expected net present value of investments. The depressing ef-
fect on investments leads to below optimal capital–reserve ratios, which raises
extraction costs, implying slower extraction.
They test their theoretical predictions on oil investment, oil production
and deforestation, and find that expropriation risk has a negative effect on
the first two, but a positive effect on deforestation. The oil investment model
shows that investments in drilling for exploration and production is decreasing
in expropriation risk.4 In the oil production model, the strength of the invest-
ment depressing effect is put up against the production rushing effect, giving
the total effect of expropriation risk on oil production rates. Reserves are
implicitly assumed to be exogenous to expropriation risk in the latter model,
which may be a strong assumption (see section 2.5.2).
Although their results are very convincing, I claim that the case of less
capital-intensive resources is not as compelling, for which I propose two rea-
sons: Firstly, deforestation in developing countries is more often than not a
result of the clearing of land area for cultivation or for firewood in households
(Deacon & Mueller, 2004; Chomitz, 2007), which, to be fair, Bohn and Deacon
are careful to point out. Therefore, forestry in these countries is not likely to
be adequately captured by a model of inter-temporal optimization. Expropri-
ation risk has been shown to be strongly negatively correlated with the level
of development (see e.g. Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005), so Bohn and Deacon’s
result may be a reflection of deforestation being more rapid when it is driven
by the need for farming area, rather than the conscious decision of a forestry
3Note that the ownership risk index in Bohn and Deacon (2000) represents a somewhat
broader measure of risk than the index in this thesis.
4Section 2.5.3 discusses how different types of investments can have different effect
on extraction. Bohn and Deacon (2000) mention this, but are not able to empirically
distinguish between different investments.
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company. Notice that if agricultural land and forests are equally exposed to
political expropriation risk, there is no obvious reason for why such risk would
increase deforestation. Secondly, we might imagine that regulation of forests
is more difficult in developing countries, e.g. because of corruption or a weak
central government. In other words, countries with bad institutions, where
expropriation risk is likely to be higher than average, might have difficulties
with assigning property rights to forests. If so, the problem is one of defining
property rights rather than enforcing them. In this case, forests are an unreg-
ulated common access resource, for which theory implies that extraction will
be socially inefficiently high, even without the issue of expropriation risk.
At this stage I want to make clear that I agree with the theoretical pre-
dictions in Bohn and Deacon (2000); however, I believe that there is room
for some improvement in the empirical testing of the theory. I have in this
section given arguments for why forests are not an appropriate representative
of a non-capital-intensive resource in this analysis, so one natural approach
is to find other resources more suitable for empirical testing. Specifically, we
could examine fairly similar non-renewable resources that are extracted from
point sources, and for which capital intensity is likely to be one of the main
differences. Most non-fluent minerals fit in this category, and although most
of them are fairly capital-intensive, we should expect to find some variation
in this respect. Section 4.1 shows how iron and different ranks of coal can be
ordered in terms of capital intensity. As far as I am aware, this thesis is the
first attempt to provide empirical evidence of the effect of expropriation risk
on resource extraction by using cross-section data on non-fluent minerals.
2.5 Ex Ante and Ex Post Effects
This section and following subsections is meant to explain in more detail the
intuition behind the two opposing effects of expropriation risk on resource
extraction. But before I do so, I find it appropriate and convenient to assign
names to these effects. I will in the rest of this thesis refer to the investment
depressing effect as the ex ante effect, and the “rushing” effect as the ex post
effect. These terms are adopted from latin, and literally mean “before the
event” and “after the event”, respectively. The “event” will in this case refer
to the sinking of capital for mineral production. Note that my only original
contribution here is that I have given names to the two effects to make their
discussion more tractable, and to make it clearer that expropriation risk, in
theory, has different effects before and after the investment decision. The
underlying theory should be attributed to others, notably Olsen (1987); Farzin
(1984); Lasserre (1982); Bohn and Deacon (2000).
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It seems worthwhile to discuss in more detail what the ex ante and ex post
effects represent, as well as how well we can hope to measure them. Within a
given country, an unexpected increase in expropriation risk will induce owners
of a resource to adjust their plans of production, taking into account that the
probability of losing the rights to the resource some time in the future has
increased. A rational response for a profit maximizing investor is to make sure
that as much as possible of the minerals are converted to financial assets before
expropriation occurs.5 But if the increase in risk also depresses investments
in resource extraction, this will tend to decrease extraction rates over time.
These are the ex post and ex ante effects, respectively. The strength of the ex
ante effect depends on how important physical capital is for production, but
the ex post effect should be fairly invariant to capital-intensity. There is also
likely an empirical difference between effects in the short run and the long
run, because investments take time to materialize.
Section 2.5.1 discusses the implications of expropriation risk if reserves are
held fixed, while section 2.5.2 briefly discusses what might happen if measures
of resource stocks are endogenous to risk. Section 2.5.3 describes different
types of investments, and section 2.5.4 discusses how the lagged effect of in-
vestments imply a difference between long run and short run effects.
2.5.1 Extraction with Fixed Reserves
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Figure 2.1: Extraction paths under with and without risk
Notes: Q denotes extraction, and t denotes time. Solid lines, f(t), and dashed lines, g(t),
represent the extraction paths without and without risk, respectively. Tc and Tu are the
terminal periods in each respective case.
5This implicitly assumes that financial assets are more secure than the resource, or that
only the latter is targeted. See Konrad et al. (1994).
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To make things more concrete, and to relate this section to the empirical
part of this thesis, I use coal and iron to represent non capital-intensive and
capital-intensive resources, respectively.6 Figure 2.1a and 2.1b show the possi-
ble effect on the extraction path for coal and iron, respectively, of an increase in
expropriation risk. Q denotes extracted amount, and t is time. Conventional
theory (notably Long, 1975), corresponding to 2.1a, suggests the extraction
path f(t) without risk, and g(t) when risk is introduced. The extraction
path is steeper with expropriation risk, and the terminal period comes sooner
(Tu < Tc); however, expropriation risk is also expected to depress investment,
which makes production from a given resource stock less efficient and more
costly, leading to slower extraction (see Perman et al., 2011, pp. 526–527).
The steepness of the curve will likely depend on the importance of capital in
production. I claim that since iron is more capital-intensive than coal, we can
expect the extraction path for coal under risk to be steeper than that for iron.
The reason is that investments in production equipment is relatively more im-
portant for iron productivity. In fact, if iron is sufficiently capital-intensive,
we might see a pattern similar to that in figure 2.1b, where the extraction path
is flatter with risk. Alternatively, we might find that both coal and iron have
flatter extraction paths under risk than without risk, but that iron extraction
is relatively flatter.
Notice that for the case in figure 2.1a, theory predicts that extraction
under risk should be higher until some time t¯, and then lower, compared to
the certainty case. This implies that when comparing production data from
two mines, in which one operates under risk and the other under no risk, we
might observe both higher and lower extraction in the risky mine, depending
on the value of t, i.e. at what time in a mine’s life we make the observation.
This is one reason why we should use extraction relative to known reserves,
rather than extraction in absolute terms, when testing the theory empirically.
Assuming 0 < g′(t) < f ′(t) ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], as well as a fixed initial resource
stock,
∫ Tc
0 f(t) dt =
∫ Tu
0 g(t) dt, it can be shown that the ratio of extraction
to reserves, defined as f(t)/F (t) will always be smaller than g(t)/G(t), where
where F (t) =
∫ Tc
t f(t) dt and G(t) =
∫ Tu
t g(t) dt give the remaining resource at
time t. In the linear case, the proof is trivial. For a proof of the general case,
consult section D.1 in the appendix. This result implies that the extraction
rate is strictly increasing in expropriation risk for coal, and strictly decreasing
in expropriation risk for iron.
The two graphs in figure 2.1 illustrate the basic theory on which the em-
pirical analysis is built. The variable of interest is the extraction rate, which
6Note that the actual effects on coal and iron could very well be in the same direction,
because they are both relatively capital-intensive. See section 4.1 for an evaluation of the
relative capital intensities of coal and iron.
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changes over time with both production and reserves. However, I only have
data on the most recently reported measure of reserves (see section 3.1.1), so
the extraction rate in my analysis will only fluctuate with production, relative
to a fixed reserve measure. For cross-mine comparisons to make sense, I need
to show that this extraction rate variable will behave in the same way as one
where reserves decrease with extraction.
Consider figure 2.1b for iron. Let t′ be the time at which my reserves data
is measured, which corresponds to 2011 for almost all mines in the sample
(confer section 3). Extraction f(t) and g(t) varies over time, but is observed
only for t ≤ t′, and F (t′) and G(t′) are constant. It is easy to see that if
f(t′)
F (t′)
>
g(t′)
G(t′)
which has been proved7 for all t′ ∈ [0, T ], then
f(t)
F (t′)
>
g(t)
G(t′)
∀ t ≤ t′ ≤ T
because
f ′(t) < g′(t) < 0 ∀ t
G(t′) > F (t′) ∀ t′ > 0
This result does not necessarily hold for t > t′, but as long production is
measured at or before the time reserves are measured, my empirical approach
is consistent with theory. Note that we expect this approach to lead to an
overestimation of early extraction rates, especially so for the steeper of the
two curves, which implies that the effect of expropriation risk might also be
overestimated. However, this should affect only the magnitude of the effect,
not its direction.
This intention of this section is to clarify how extraction rates are expected
to vary between mines in countries with different expropriation risk. Within a
given country there is likely a difference between short run and long run effects,
but it is outside the scope of this thesis to go into details of the dynamics at
7The proof in appendix D.1 is for the non-capital-intensive case, but the same proof
obviously also holds for the capital-intensive case.
12
work. Simply put, the empirical analysis will focus on how extraction rates
are affected by expropriation risk, based on the following three conjectures:8
Conjecture 1: Expropriation risk affects natural resource extraction rates
negatively through the ex ante effect and positively through the ex post
effect;
Conjecture 2: The ex ante effect is increasing in capital intensity of re-
sources, while the ex post is invariant to capital intensity;
Conjecture 3: The higher the capital intensity, the less positive—or more
negative—is the total effect of expropriation risk on extraction rates.
2.5.2 Extraction with Endogenous Reserves
The area under the graphs in figure 2.1a and 2.1b give the initial economically
viable stock of the resource, all of which is assumed to be discovered and
known in the first period. This resource stock was assumed to be invariant
to expropriation risk, i.e.
∫ Tc
0 f(t) dt =
∫ Tu
0 g(t) dt, which corresponds to an
implicit assumption in the oil production model of Bohn and Deacon (2000).
There are, however, several reasons why the assumption of exogenous reserves
may not hold. Firstly, measures of reserves do not generally reflect the physical
size of the resource, but rather that part of the resource that can be extracted
with a profit. A decrease in investment also decreases the economically viable
part of the resource stock, because marginal production costs increase, making
less of the physical stock profitably extractable. Secondly, assuming that
continuous exploration is required to discover more of a resource, the decrease
in investments that accompanies expropriation risk will also decrease known
physical reserves compared to the certainty case. Thirdly, the reserves variable
used in the empirical analysis is mostly based on company reporting (see
section 3.1). Companies that find themselves threatened by expropriation
may have an incentive to underreport their reserves in order to mitigate the
risk.9 Thus if expropriation risk increases, there are at least three reasons
why the measure of reserves may decrease, so reserves are not necessarily
exogenous.10
To clarify the implications of endogenous reserves, a stylized example of
8These conjectures are based on the theory in Bohn and Deacon (2000), as is the rest
of the discussion in this section.
9Durnev and Fauver (2011) and Durnev and Guriev (2011) show that expropriation
risk reduces company transparency.
10Reserves may be endogenous also with respect to the price of the resource.
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extraction paths with and without expropriation risk is given in figure 2.2.11
Let A and B be two identical coal companies with the same initial extraction
path, assumed to be linear for simplicity, given by the less steep solid line in
figure 2.2a.12 Suppose they are both faced with the option of investing in a
project that will increase productivity, which in turn will increase the part of
known resources that is economically profitable to extract. Without any risk
of expropriation this project has a positive expected present value for both
firms. An increase in reserves would shift out the extraction path, shown by
the dashed lines in figure 2.2a, and the additional reserves is equal to the
increase in the area under the graph. Before the investment decision is made
however, company A becomes exposed to expropriation risk, while B remains
protected from this risk. Suppose that this makes the project unprofitable for
company A, because the risk has significantly increased the expected present
value of future returns. The result is that only company B invests in the
project, giving an outward shift in the extraction curve, to the flatter of the
two dashed lines.
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Figure 2.2: Extraction paths with endogenous reserves
Notes: Q denotes extraction, and t denotes time. Solid lines are the extraction paths before
investment, the steeper of which represents the ex post effect of expropriation risk, dashed
lines represent extraction paths after investment. The ex ante effect can be thought of as
the difference between the steepest solid line and the steepest dashed line.
The ex ante effect on company A can be illustrated by the fact that they
now do not invest in the project, giving lower extraction in each period and
lower reserves than if the investment had been made. The ex post effect
increases the slope of the extraction path, to the solid steeper line in figure
11This graphical analysis is quite informal, and is made only to illustrate an idea. A
more rigorous mathematical analysis might have been appropriate, but since this thesis is
mainly empirical, I have not done this.
12The lines in the figure are unlabeled to make the illustrations clearer. The text indicates
which lines relate to which mine.
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2.2a. Compare this curve to the dashed line parallel to it: If there were
no effect of risk on investment, extraction would have been higher in every
period, so risk depresses extraction through investment. Notice, however,
that the extraction rate would actually be lower without the ex ante effect,
i.e if the investment were made. To see why, compare the ratio of current
extraction to remaining reserves at any time t: The outward shift increases
reserves relatively more than extraction, so the ratio goes down. The reason
is that, in this particular case, the increase in reserves is accompanied by an
increase in the terminal period, so that extraction is more spread out over
time.
However, Perman et al. (2011) show that if productivity increases (or
marginal cost decreases), the time until exhaustion will decrease, and the
extraction path will generally be steeper. That is to say, in the absence of
expropriation risk, the increase in productivity both expands reserves and
tilts the extraction path, the latter of which is what I stated in section 2.5.1.
Thus the effect on the extraction rate is ambiguous, and will likely depend
on capital intensity. There was ambiguity also in the case with fixed reserves;
however, endogenous reserves is a second source of ambiguity.
A possible response of extraction of a more capital-intensive resource to
an increase in risk is shown in figure 2.2b. Note that the relevant curves for
comparison of mines is the steepest of the solid lines and the flatter of the
dashed lines. In the figure, the extraction path is steeper in the risky mine,
but since reserves have increased in the non-risky mine, the total effect on
extraction rates is theoretically ambiguous.
The discussion in this section is intended to trigger some reflection over
how endogenous reserves may cause some complications for empirical work,
but a more formal theoretical study is required in order to thoroughly assess
the effects of such an assumption.13 Note that, although this section implies
some of the dynamics involved, this is not the focus of the empirical analysis.
For simplicity I will in the rest of the thesis assume that the reserves measure
is exogenous to expropriation risk.
2.5.3 Different Types of Investments
There are three main categories of mining investments: investments in ex-
ploration, start-up investments for production and investments for further
expanding production in existing mines. Exploratory investments may be
related to undiscovered deposits, as well as undiscovered reserves within or
13Venables (2011) presents a model with endogenous field openings, which could perhaps
be extended to include expropriation risk.
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nearby operating deposits.14 Investments in exploration will intuitively be in-
creasing over time, and different between countries or mines with unequal de-
grees of depletion—the most easily discoverable reserves are found first (Bohn
& Deacon, 2000). Start-up investments involve for example construction of
specialized infrastructure (railways, pipes etc.), structures (e.g. mine shafts)
and purchase of mining machinery (e.g. drilling and earth moving machines)
(Ferreira & Vincent, 2010). If minerals are processed within mines, invest-
ments may also include mills and machinery for mineral processing. Expan-
sionary investments may be similar to start-up investments, but occur only
after a mine has been put into operation. These investments may be necessary
to gain access to new parts of a deposit, or aimed at improving productivity.
The data set used in the estimations does not adequately distinguish between
different types of investments, and all three categories are likely to be found
in the investment variable (confer section 4.1).
Whether we can expect to find expansionary investments over the lifetime
of a mine likely depends on both uncertainty and geology. A once and for all
start-up investment in mining capital might be optimal under full certainty,
and if geological conditions permit it. Spreading out investments over time
might be the better choice if uncertainty is generally high, including expro-
priation risk, and if deposits have properties demanding regular expansion
investments (Olsen, 1987).
2.5.4 Long and Short Run Effects
The ex post effect is quite intuitive and easy to understand, and is likely ob-
servable in the short run. Isolating this effect, we should expect that extraction
happens faster in mines that are exposed to risk, and also that extraction in-
creases over time within mines when risk increases. Explaining and testing the
ex ante effect is more cumbersome, and it might vary depending the nature
of the investment. Investments take time to materialize, which implies that
any ex ante effect of an increase in risk is not visible right away. This further
implies that the observed between-mine and within-mine effects might not be
the same.
Notice that the simple theory in section 2.5.1 is basically an exercise in
comparative statics for the extraction path with and without risk. It does not
say anything about the transition from zero to positive expropriation risk.
In empirical studies, one must take into account that investments are likely
to have a lagged effect on extraction. This is probably especially true for
investments in exploration—it may take years from the start of exploration
before any production takes place. If expropriation risk increased to such
14Further exploration of known deposits could also be thought of as expansions.
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a level that all exploratory activity stopped, but all other investments were
unaffected, we wouldn’t expect the ex ante effect to be visible in the short run,
because exploratory activity has no effect on extraction from deposits that
are already known. The effects of start-up investments should also appear
with a lag, but less so than for exploration, since the former in some sense
represents a later step in the process of opening mining operations at a new
site. Expansionary investments may have a lag similar to that of start-up
investments, but the effect might not be as pronounced, because existing
capital equipment could still be employed in production, though less efficiently.
Political institutions tend to be persistent (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robin-
son, 2001), which implies that between country variation in expropriation risk
should be larger than within-country variation. This, along with the discus-
sion in the preceding paragraph, implies that long run effects of risk are more
likely to be found in cross-country or cross-mine analysis. That is to say, if
the time-period under investigation is fairly short, ex ante effects might not
be visible over time within the same mine, only between mines. Figure 2.3
illustrates this idea for for country-level extraction, where LR, MR and HR
denotes low risk, medium risk and high risk countries, respectively. The lines
in the figure represent what we can expect to observe in the data. The solid
upward sloping lines are the within-country effects of expropriation risk on
extraction; however, because risk in is higher in the high risk country, on av-
erage, extraction is also lower on average than in the medium risk and low risk
countries. This conjecture has implications for how the empirical analysis is
done, for example regarding the choice between the OLS and the fixed effect
estimator. In figure 2.3, the dashed line represents the slope that the OLS
estimator might produce, which is a weighted average of the between- and
within-effects.
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Figure 2.3: Within and between effects
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3 | Data
The empirical analysis in this thesis is based on data on mineral production,
reserves and investments in individual mines, as well as a cross-country index
that quantifies the level of expropriation risk. Section 3.1 presents the mineral
data, specifically how production and reserves are defined and reported, and
describes the final sample used in regressions, while section 3.2 presents the
expropriation risk index used as the main explanatory variable of interest.
3.1 Mineral Data
In this thesis, only iron and different ranks of coal are considered, because
it makes the analysis more convenient.1 The reason is that with most other
minerals of economic importance, for example gold, silver and copper, produc-
tion normally involves a metallurgical process of separating different metals
from the same ore. The distribution of these minerals in the actual output
may be quite random, because metal concentration can vary widely within
the same ore. Iron and coal mining however, seems to be more of a “what you
dig is what you get”-process. Since the purpose of this thesis is to examine
the behavior of mining companies, I find it more convenient to not include
in the analysis minerals for which actual output is fairly random—what is
interesting is how expropriation risk affects mining effort, not the actual out-
put. This could still be achieved for these minerals by using ore production
instead of metal output. This is not feasible, however, because the dataset
does not distinguish between missing and zero values of this variable. Also,
data on grades and concentrations of different metals within the ores in each
production year is missing for a great number of observations, so consistent
valuation of this ore output would be cumbersome. Note that this randomness
wouldn’t be expected to bias the results, but it would increase the variance of
the error term in the regression.
1Coal rank is a measure of the level of organic metamorphism, that is, how much
heat and pressure the coal deposit has been exposed to. See http://geology.com/rocks/
coal.shtml.
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Diamonds are not considered in this thesis because production value is
difficult to derive, owing to the fact that the price of diamonds largely depends
on their quality. Section 4.1 describes how project investments and mean
production value is used to classify iron and coal in terms of capital intensity,
and the data on diamonds is not suitable for this method.
Data on iron and coal mining operations is collected from the IntierraRMG
Raw Materials Database (RMD) (IntierraRMG, 2013).2 IntierraRMG is a re-
source intelligence agency that provides monthly updated data on the resource
sector. The RMD includes a wide array of variables on minerals, including pro-
duction, reserves, investment, geology, mining technology and mineral grade.
The data is mainly based on company reporting, alternatively on official coun-
try statistics. In cases where company reporting is insufficient or absent, In-
tierraRMG provide their own estimates. The valuation of output is based on
iron and coal prices retrieved from the US Geological Survey and US Energy
Information Administration, respectively (see table A.4 in the appendix).
3.1.1 Production and Reserves Data
The production data is measured in million metric tonnes, and runs from
1984–2012 for iron and 2000–2012 for coal. However, because observations for
2012 involves a lot of missing values due to a lack of reporting, I have chosen
to limit the time period to 2011. Production of iron and coal is defined as
gross weight of salable concentrate and run-of-mine coal output, respectively.3
For iron, gross weight of actual ore production is also available, though with a
shorter time-series, and with no distinction between missing and zero values.
Most of the production data is reported by the mining companies. Where
this is not available, IntierraRMG have estimated the production data, when
feasible, e.g. based on information about mine capacity. Whether or not to
include estimated data in the regressions is a question of what we believe
about the reliability of these estimates, on which there is not much to go on
from the description of the dataset. However, because the share of estimated
data seems to be very low and evenly distributed between countries, there
should not be large issues with including these observations.4
Reserves are defined as the economically viable part of measured or indi-
cated resources, and are the sum of proven and probable ore reserves. The
measure of reserves will generally depend on current prices and expectations
2I want to thank Professor Helge Hveem at the Department of Political Science, Univer-
sity of Oslo, for arranging access to these data, through an agreement with IntierraRMG.
3Run-of-mine output refers to the production of crude coal. I refer to World Coal
Institute (2005) for further details about the coal mining process.
4Although the dataset indicates observations for which production is estimated, the
proprietary dataset software is limited with regards to exporting this information.
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of future prices, as well as expropriation risk (see section 2.5.2). In order for
cross-mine comparisons to make sense, production must be made relative to
the size of reserves. This is a limiting factor on the sample, because reserves
data is only reported for slightly more than half of the coal mines, and less
than half of the iron mines. Data on reserves are inconveniently only available
for the most recent estimate, which means that while production varies from
year to year, reserves are held fixed.5 Theory predicts that this might lead
to an overestimation of extraction rates for early periods (see section 2.5.1.),
but the qualitative results should be consistent with an analysis with varying
reserves.
3.1.2 The Sample
Table 3.1 shows how the mines in the sample are distributed between countries.
China is the most heavily represented country in the coal sector, with 44 %
of non-bituminous coal mines and 22 % of bituminous coal mines, followed by
Russia, India and the United States. Almost one third of the iron mines in
the sample are in India, with Russia, Australia, the United states and Brazil
collectively with another third. Note that the because countries with poor
institutions likely also have poor reporting, mines in less developed countries
may be underrepresented in the sample. Summary statistics on country-level
production, reserves and average production rates are given in A.2 in appendix
A, and the distribution of mine-years by country is shown in table A.1.
Any exclusions of observations from the final sample are made because of
missing data. For observations where data on production or reserves is not
available, the dependent variable ln(production/reserves) is undefined. The
time series on iron production is limited by the the expropriation risk variable,
which only goes back to 1995.6 Finally, because bituminous, sub-bituminous,
anthracite and lignite coal have different prices, lprice is missing for mines
where coal rank is not reported, so these mines are also excluded. The final
sample contains 16,215 observations of 1,579 mines in 46 countries, with an
average time-period of a little over 10 years.
5I could attempt to deal with this by ‘backtracking’ reserves, adding production in
period t to reserves in period t − 1, so as to get a reserves variable that declines with
production. This would however generally yield inconsistent values of the new variable,
because of missing production data.
6This is very unfortunate, because there is likely a number of interesting events that
could affect property rights measures in the years 1984–1994.
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Table 3.1: Distribution of mines in the sample
Non-bitum. coal Bitum. coal Iron
Freq. Pct. Freq. Pct. Freq. Pct.
Algeria 3 1.73
Argentina 1 0.24
Australia 10 2.43 85 8.54 19 10.98
Austria 1 0.58
Bangladesh 1 0.10
Botswana 1 0.10
Brazil 1 0.10 13 7.51
Canada 8 1.95 15 1.51 4 2.31
Chile 5 2.89
China 182 44.28 219 22.01 1 0.58
Colombia 8 0.80
Czech Rep. 6 1.46 4 0.40
Egypt 1 0.10 1 0.58
Germany 1 0.24
Greece 5 1.22
Hungary 4 0.97
India 19 4.62 169 16.98 52 30.06
Indonesia 17 4.14 12 1.21
Iran 8 4.62
Kazakhstan 1 0.24 5 0.50 2 1.16
Liberia 1 0.58
Mauritania 2 1.16
Mexico 1 0.24 1 0.10 6 3.47
Mongolia 3 0.73 3 0.30
Mozambique 1 0.10
New Zealand 5 1.22 2 0.20 2 1.16
Niger 1 0.10
Norway 3 0.30 3 1.73
Peru 1 0.58
Philippines 1 0.24
Poland 5 1.22 37 3.72
Romania 11 2.68
Russia 64 15.57 183 18.39 17 9.83
Serbia 2 0.49
South Africa 6 1.46 43 4.32 5 2.89
Swaziland 1 0.24
Sweden 2 1.16
Thailand 1 0.24
Tunisia 1 0.58
Turkey 9 2.19 4 0.40 6 3.47
UK 1 0.24 7 0.70
USA 37 9.00 111 11.16 9 5.20
Ukraine 10 2.43 74 7.44 6 3.47
Uzbekistan 1 0.10
Venezuela 2 0.20 3 1.73
Zimbabwe 1 0.10
Total 411 100.00 995 100.00 173 100.00
Source: IntierraRMG RMD 21
3.2 Expropriation Risk Index
In order to examine the effect of expropriation risk on mineral extraction,
the relevant sources of this risk must be defined and a variable measuring it
must be obtained. There are many sources of ownership risk, notably violent
conflict, including guerrilla warfare, revolutions, political instability and the
type and quality of a country’s institutions. Bohn and Deacon (2000) define
ownership risk broadly, and construct an index from instability events and
regime changes, but the index does not explicitly account for formal property
rights institutions. Instead they assume that regime type is a proxy for these
formal institutions.
This thesis is mainly concerned with ownership risk that is driven by a
country’s political and judicial institutions, for which there are two reasons.
Firstly, the theories presented in section 2 are mostly based on the political
aspect of risk, so my choice of variable is made to make the empirical analysis
as consistent with theory as possible. Secondly, political institutions have a
given geographical area of relevance, defined by a country’s national borders,
and are as such relevant for all mines within the same countries. Instability
events such as conflicts and guerrilla warfare might be limited to a certain area
of a country, or even cross national borders, which implies that these events
will not affect all mines within a given country in the same way. Geospatial
data on individual mines was not available until the April update of the RMD
dataset, so such an approach was not feasible within the time frame of this
thesis. Therefore, in this thesis ownership risk is taken to mean expropriation
risk, making a variable describing the quality of national institutions a natural
choice.
The empirical analysis employs the ‘property rights’ variable from the
Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) (The Heritage Foundation, 2013).7 The
Heritage Foundation is a conservative think tank based in Washington D.C.
that promotes economic freedom and limited government. The non-neutral
nature of the organization might be a cause of concern for the reliability of the
data they produce. Because of its agenda of showing that economic freedom
is good for economic growth, one might suspect that the data is constructed
so as to confirm these beliefs. An implication of this is that the index might
be endogenous to economic growth or GDP levels, by construction. There is
not much else to say than that this may be a weakness to my analysis, but
that the IEF is the best available alternative for the purpose of this thesis.8
The Index of Economic Freedom covers 185 countries over the time-period
7Further information can be found at http://www.heritage.org/index/property-rights.
8Ideally, I would have checked for robustness with other indices, but other datasets of
the same type, such as the BERI and PRS ICRG indices, are very costly.
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1995–2013. It is based on a weighted average of ten different sub-indicators,
one of which is the ‘property rights’ variable. This variable runs from 0 to
100, where 0 represents no protection of property rights and 100 is maximum
protection of property rights. The Heritage Foundation defines it as follows
(“Property Rights”, n.d., para. 1):
“The property rights component is an assessment of the ability of
individuals to accumulate private property [...] It measures the
degree to which a country’s laws protect private property rights
and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. It also
assesses the likelihood that private property will be expropriated
and analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of
corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and
businesses to enforce contracts.”
There are two sides of property rights implied by this definition: (i) the
protection of private property from other private parties, and (ii) the protec-
tion of private property from government expropriation. Although discussions
in this thesis are mostly concerned with the latter of the two, both relate to
formal political institutions, and both are likely to influence extraction deci-
sions.
In order to make the interpretation of the risk variable more consistent
with the terminology in the rest of this thesis, I construct an expropriation
risk variable, defined as 100−‘property rights’. Interpreting expropriation risk
as the opposite of the protection of property rights should not be too contro-
versial. Table 3.2 gives summary statistics for this variable, called exprisk for
short, over all the observations in the sample. Notice that the between mine
standard deviation is close to six times higher than the within-mine standard
deviation.9 This is consistent with institutions being persistent, as proposed
in section 2.5.3, and has implications for model estimation and interpretation.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics for expropriation risk—exprisk
Mean Std. dev. Min Max Observations
Overall 53.06 24.49 5 100 N = 16215
Between 24.14 7 90 n = 1579
Within 4.68 25.41 84.31 T = 10.27
Source: Heritage Foundation 2013 Index of Economic Freedom.
9Table A.6 gives the average expropriation risk of countries in the sample.
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4 | Empirical Strategy
The theory presented in section 2.5.1 and the corresponding conjectures 1–3
describe the theoretical framework on which the empirical analysis is built.
This chapter provides a description and discussion of the methods used to
incorporate this framework into an econometric analysis. The analysis is done
in two steps: First determining which mineral is more capital-intensive, and
then using this information to examine how the effects of expropriation risk
change with capital intensity. The first step is given in section 4.1, where iron
and coal are categorized in terms of capital intensity. Section 4.2 specifies the
econometric model used in the second step and discusses some assumptions
of the model, as well as the choice of estimator.
4.1 Determining Capital Intensities
In section 2.4 I presented some arguments for why the relationship between
expropriation risk and deforestation found in Bohn and Deacon (2000) may
be spurious. Specifically, because forests are a common access resource if
unregulated, deforestation may be driven by other factors than expropriation
risk. Hence one of the most important features of this thesis is that I compare
non-exhaustible resources that are as similar as possible in all aspects other
than capital intensity, specifically iron and coal. The mineral sector is capital-
intensive in general (see e.g. Campbell, 1980), but there is also likely to be
differences between minerals, because the technologies required for extraction
differ. Section 4.1.1 presents the method with which I propose to categorize
minerals with respect to capital intensity, and this method is then applied to
the RMD dataset in section 4.1.2.
4.1.1 The Method
In order to classify minerals by capital intensity I use the ‘project cost’ variable
from the RawMaterials Database (IntierraRMG, 2013). This variable includes
“[t]he sum of mine, plant and local infrastructure investments. Costs of e.g.
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harbour, railway, refinery etc. are not included.” (IntierraRMG, 2004, p. 59).
In other words, this variable seems to be an appropriate indicator of sunk cost
for each mine. Dividing it by the mean value of output gives a mine specific
indicator of capital intensity, measured in percent. Note that the motivation
for doing this is to make it meaningful to compare mines of different sizes,
as well as relating investments to the value of the extracted mineral. More
common measures of capital intensity are capital–output ratios and capital–
labor ratios; however, I do not have mine-level data on these variables, and
collecting country-level data for all the countries in the sample would be too
time consuming for the time frame of this thesis.
The relevance of this investment–output ratio as a proxy for capital inten-
sity needs a discussion. These investments may be of both start-up, expan-
sionary and exploratory nature. Although in some cases it reflects investments
made at a preliminary stage of mine development, some mines have positive
values for this variable way into the years of operation. This arguably reflects
the cost of further expanding existing mines, i.e. “digging deeper”, improving
technology or simply increasing capacity. For large deposits, a project may
only involve parts of the operation, i.e. the expansion of one of many mining
sites. It may also reflect the construction of new mining sites within the same
operation. This could be reflected in a small project cost relative to the value
of overall output, thus underestimating the true capital intensity. It is diffi-
cult to determine observations for which this is the case. Assuming that the
operations in most deposits are concentrated in a small geographical area, and
that mining from a deposit is limited to one or two sites, the error shouldn’t
be very large, and at least not systematic.
The investment–output ratio will most likely reflect mostly expansionary
investments, because for mines that are in the preliminary stages of operation,
and no actual production has taken place, the investment–output ratio is
undefined. Intuitively, when more of the reserves are extracted, investments
must be made in order to make use of those parts of the deposit that are not
as easily accessible. Hence the project cost variable can arguably be assumed
to be an indicator of the typical size of investment required to keep the mine
in operation at a normal level of production, which I believe can be assumed
to be correlated with the typical start-up investment. The average of the
investment–output ratio for all mines of a certain mineral should then reflect
the typical size of investments for that mineral, relative to production value.
This is exactly what theory says matters for mining companies: If mining of a
mineral in general requires a large sunk cost investment relative to the value
of the extracted mineral, expropriation risk will reduce the incentives to go
through with that investment.
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4.1.2 Investment–output Comparisons
Table 4.1 shows a comparison between iron and coal mines of mean project
cost divided by average production value. Only observations for which the
project cost takes a positive value are included, because the dataset does
not distinguish between missing values and zero for this variable. The mean
for iron is more than twice as large as the mean for coal, and significantly
larger at the 10% level, when variances are assumed to be unequal.1 This
result indicates that iron mines in the sample on average have higher capital
intensity than do coal mines. The standard deviation of the means is quite
large for both minerals, which implies that projects may be of widely different
types and magnitudes from one mine to the next. This is not unexpected,
since there are a number of reasons for why project costs might differ between
mines.
Table 4.1: Comparing the capital intensities of coal and iron
Mineral N Mean Std.Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
Coal 180 13.53 3.96 53.11 [5.72, 21.34]
Iron 46 29.31 11.45 77.63 [6.26, 52.37]
Combined 226 16.75 3.93 59.07 [9.00, 24.49]
diff = mean(coal) − mean(iron) t = –1.3029
H0: diff = 0 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 56.2054
H1: diff < 0 H1: diff 6= 0 H1: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0990 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1979 Pr(T > t) = 0.9010
Notes: Source: IntierraRMG RMD. Variable defined in section 4.1.1. Unequal variances
assumed. Observations are limited to non-zero ‘project cost’, but not to regression sample.
The results thus far are encouraging, but we may be able to do even bet-
ter, because a difference in capital intensity is possible not only between iron
and coal, but also within different ranks of coal. Consequently, the difference
in means between iron and coal should not be as pronounced for some coal
ranks. For example, Topp et al. (2008) show that the iron sector of Australia
has roughly the same capital–output ratio as the coal sector. Note, however,
that most of Australia’s coal production consists of bituminous coal: 75% of
Australian coal mines in the sample produce bituminous coal, and production
of bituminous coal is more than twice as high as non-bituminous coal. Fur-
thermore, according to Creamer et al. (1960), bituminous coal had roughly
two times the capital–output ratio of anthracite coal and other non-metals in
1953, in fact similar to most metals. The reason is apparently that the bitu-
minous mining process generates insecure working conditions that will likely
1Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom is a weighted average of the degrees of freedom for
each group.
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necessitate higher investments in equipment to prevent fatalities and other
disasters (Stephan, 1998).
One might argue that the capital intensity for a specific mineral is not
necessarily the same today as it was in 1953. For example, in countries where
mineral stocks are close to the initial endowment, the amount of investment in
physical capital required to extract one unit of mineral will intuitively be lower
than in countries where mineral stocks are close to exhausted. Also, mineral-
specific technical progress in mining can cause optimal capital–output ratios
to change over time for some minerals, while it for others stays constant.
Therefore, a mineral that used to be relatively non-capital-intensive may be
found to have a high capital intensity today. However, if relative capital
intensities have not changed too much over the past 60 years, we can expect
that distinguishing between different coal ranks is worthwhile. Any difference
in effects might be substantial, because almost half the mines in the dataset,
and 70 % of the mines in the sample, are reported to be producing mainly
bituminous coal (see table A.3 in appendix A).
In table 4.2 the sample mean project cost divided by mean production
value is shown to be significantly higher for bituminous coal than for other coal
ranks. The difference is both more pronounced and more significant compared
to table 4.1—bituminous coal has more than three times the investment–
output ratio of non-bituminous coal, on average. The difference is significant
at the 5% level, with a p-value of 0.0237. Comparing the investment–output
ratios of iron and non-bituminous coal mines in table 4.3 further confirms the
predictions. By this measure, iron is roughly six times as capital-intensive as
non-bituminous coal, and the difference is significant with a p-value of 0.0191.
Hence both bituminous coal and iron are more capital-intensive than non-
bituminous coal, but the difference is larger for iron. Table 4.4 shows that
iron has almost twice the average investment–output ratio than bituminous
coal, but the difference is only significant at the 15 % level. That is to say,
the average difference is quite substantial, but the variation between mines is
too large for confirming this statistically.
We conclude from the above discussion that iron and bituminous coal are a
lot more capital-intensive than non-bituminous coal. We also strongly suspect
that iron is more capital-intensive than bituminous coal, but more evidence
would be needed to confirm this statistically. Relating this to conjecture 3 in
section 2.5.1, we expect that the effect of expropriation risk on the extraction
rate for iron is more strongly negative (or less positive) than for bituminous
coal, and we expect both of these to exhibit a stronger negative (or less posi-
tive) effect than non-bituminous coal.
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Table 4.2: Comparing the capital intensities of bituminous and non-
bituminous coal
Mineral N Mean Std.Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
Non-bituminous 31 4.15 1.14 6.36 [1.82, 6.48]
Bituminous 123 13.09 4.32 47.94 [4.53, 21.65]
Combined 154 11.29 3.47 43.05 [4.44, 18.14]
diff = mean(nonbitum) − mean(bitum) t = –2.0001
H0: diff = 0 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 136.904
H1: diff < 0 H1: diff 6= 0 H1: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0237 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0475 Pr(T > t) = 0.9763
Notes: Source: IntierraRMG RMD. Variable defined in section 4.1.1. Unequal variances
assumed. Observations are limited to non-zero ‘project cost’, but not to regression sample.
Table 4.3: Comparing the capital intensities of iron and non-bituminous coal
Mineral N Mean Std.Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
Non-bitum. coal 31 4.15 1.14 6.36 [1.82, 6.48]
Iron 46 24.20 9.33 63.29 [5.40, 43.00]
Combined 77 16.13 5.68 49.85 [4.81, 27.44]
diff = mean(nonbitum) − mean(iron) t = –2.1330
H0: diff = 0 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 46.3416
H1: diff < 0 H1: diff 6= 0 H1: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0191 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0383 Pr(T > t) = 0.9809
Notes: Source: IntierraRMG RMD. Variable defined in section 4.1.1. Unequal variances
assumed. Observations are limited to non-zero ‘project cost’, but not to regression sample.
Table 4.4: Comparing the capital intensities of iron and bituminous coal
Mineral N Mean Std.Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval
Bituminous coal 123 13.09 4.32 47.94 [4.53, 21.65]
Iron 46 24.20 9.33 63.29 [5.40, 43.00]
Combined 169 16.11 4.05 52.60 [8.13, 24.10]
diff = mean(bitum) − mean(iron) t = –1.0803
H0: diff = 0 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 65.2767
H1: diff < 0 H1: diff 6= 0 H1: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.1420 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2840 Pr(T > t) = 0.8580
Notes: Source: IntierraRMG RMD. Variable defined in section 4.1.1. Unequal variances
assumed. Observations are limited to non-zero ‘project cost’, but not to regression sample.
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4.2 Regression Model
Based on conjectures 1–3 in section 2.5.1 and the investment–output com-
parisons in section 4.1.2, equation (1) describes the econometric model on
which the empirical analysis is built. The dependent variable is lprodrateit ≡
ln(productionit/reservesi), and explanatory variables of interest are expriskit,
expriskit× ironi and expriskit× bituminousi. εit is a disturbance and ui are
unobserved mine-specific effects.2
ln(productionit/reservesi) = β0 + β1expriskit + β2expriskit × ironi+
β3expriskit × bituminousi + δ′zit + ui + εit (1)
exprisk is the expropriation risk index described in section 3.2, while
exprisk × iron and exprisk × bituminous are interactions between the ex-
propriation risk index and dummies for iron and bituminous coal mines, re-
spectively.3 iron takes the value 1 for observations from iron mines, and 0
otherwise, and bituminous takes the value 1 for bituminous coal mines, oth-
erwise 0. This implies that all coal mines that are not reported to produce
mainly bituminous coal are part of the reference group.
The interaction variables make the effect of expropriation risk mineral
dependent—i.e. capital intensity dependent—and are in the rest of this thesis
are referred to as expriskiron and expriskbitum. δ′ is a coefficient vector,
and zit is the corresponding vector of variables that are thought to explain
mineral production, but for which the coefficients are not interesting per se.4
This vector includes, among others, a time trend in order to account for
changes in technology and input prices, as well as the log of annual average
commodity price. There are probably a number of other variables that may
explain changes in extraction—notably technology and geological conditions—
but the dataset provides limited information about such properties of individ-
ual mines, so they are not included. Following Bohn and Deacon (2000) I use
the log of the production rate, because it seems to fit the data better.
∂lprodrate
∂exprisk
= β1 + β2iron+ β3bituminous (2)
2See table A.5 in appendix A for a description of the variables and their sources.
3The dummies themselves are not included in fixed effects regressions, because they are
constant within mine. In this context their coefficients are not interesting in themselves, so
the dummies are included in zit.
4Vectors are here defined as column vectors, so δ′ is a row vector.
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The partial effect of expropriation risk on lprodrate is given in equa-
tion (2). β1 can be both positive and negative; it describes the effect of
expropriation risk given that the mineral is non-bituminous coal, i.e. when
iron = bituminous = 0. This effect depends on the relative magnitude of the
ex ante and ex post effects for non-bituminous coal. β2 should be negative,
because iron is more capital-intensive than non-bituminous coal, on average.
This implies that the ex ante effect should be stronger, decreasing the total
effect of risk on extraction. β1 +β2 then gives the total effect of expropriation
risk for iron. By the same argument, β3 should also be negative, because bitu-
minous coal is more capital-intensive than other coal ranks, on average. The
total effect of expropriation risk on bituminous coal is then β1 + β3. Recall
that the ranking with respect to capital intensity in section 4.1.2 was statisti-
cally inconclusive when comparing iron and bituminous coal, so the absolute
value of β2 relative to β3 is ambiguous. Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 in the fol-
lowing discuss some of the the assumptions of the regression model described
by equation (1), and how these assumptions affect the choice of estimation
method.
4.2.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity
One consequence of leaving out variables describing for example technology
and geology is that it leads to issues related to unobserved heterogeneity, rep-
resented by ui in equation 1. This heterogeneity introduces different problems
depending on whether or not the unobserved effects are correlated with the re-
gressor variables in the model, xit, i.e. depending on whether cov(ui,xit) = 0
or not. If they are not correlated, the OLS estimator is still unbiased and
consistent, but there is serial correlation in the disturbances. This can be
alleviated by clustering the standard errors or applying the random effects
estimator (see Wooldridge, 2010). The choice between the random effects and
pooled OLS estimator depends on some additional assumptions, specifically
about exogeneity of regressors, which is discussed in section 4.2.2.
Heterogeneity can arise both between countries and between mines, but
there can be made a number of arguments for why we should assume mine-
specific unobserved heterogeneity: Differences in geology of the deposit, here-
under concentration of the mineral in ores and average depth of deposits.
Extraction technology may also differ, and is largely unobserved. Local in-
frastructure is another factor that is likely to be time-invariant, but cross-
section variant. A likely suspect with which these heterogeneities might be
correlated is the expropriation risk variable. The reason is that countries with
high expropriation risk are also likely to be less developed, and thus employ
less sophisticated technologies and bad infrastructure. Acemoglu and John-
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son (2005), for example, show that property rights institutions do affect long
run growth, opening up for correlation between measures of property rights
and technology. This may, however, not be a big concern: Because of the
multi-national nature of many mining companies, technologies are likely to be
similar across countries, and fairly independent of development. Also, we may
believe that the same companies will invest in local infrastructure to be able
to transport extracted resources, as well as gaining goodwill of the authorities
in a country or region.
A substantial part of the unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be at-
tributable to the long-run effects of expropriation risk. That is to say, in-
vestments, and thus the amount of capital equipment in the resource sector
will be low if risk has been persistently high for a long time, making extraction
more costly and less rapid, on average. In econometric terminology this means
that there are some unobserved mine-specific effects that are correlated with
some of the regressors, exprisk, expriskiron and expriskbitum, but also the
dependent variable, lprodrate. This may result in an omitted variables bias,
suggesting that the fixed effects regressor is appropriate. But this also implies
that be bias in the coefficients from a pooled OLS estimation arguably largely
reflects what we have already predicted; that is, long run effects of expropria-
tion risk should be more noticeable between mines in different countries. That
is to say, the problem of unobserved correlated heterogeneity is not necessarily
a problem at all, but a feature of the dynamics of the theoretical model that
enables us to observe long run effects through OLS estimation.
Note that the causal factor that we are interested in is the expropriation
risk, but the channels through which this affects extraction are the ex ante
and ex post effects. The latter effect should be relatively directly observable
within each mine, and the definition of this effect implies a direct impact of
risk on extraction decisions. The response of extraction through the former
effect is not direct, but goes through investment decisions, which over time
determines the amount of capital equipment in production, resulting in the
ultimate response of extraction. Consequently, the ex ante effect is not directly
observable, but rather implied by the difference in coefficients between the
OLS (or random effects) and fixed effects estimations. The conclusion is thus
that we look to the OLS estimation for long run effects, including both the ex
ante and the ex post effects, and the fixed effects estimation for the short run
(ex post) effects.5
5Note that if cov(ui,xit) = 0, random effects is preferred over fixed effects because of
its efficiency properties: Fixed effects regression leaves out all the between group variation,
leading to higher variance. In this case, however, I choose to consider all three estimators
because the fixed effects estimation is proposed to tell a different story than the random
effects and OLS estimations.
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4.2.2 Exogeneity of Explanatory Variables
The choice between the random effects and OLS estimators depends on what
assumptions we make about the errors. Random effects estimation requires
E(εit|xi1, ...,xiT ) = 0 i.e. strict exogeneity, in which case both OLS and ran-
dom effects are unbiased and consistent, but only the latter is efficient. If strict
exogeneity does not hold, but E(εit|xit) = 0 (no contemporary correlation)
does, we should use pooled OLS with clustered standard errors. The fixed
effects estimator is consistent even if cov(ui,xit) 6= 0, but does also require
strict exogeneity.
The assumption of strictly exogenous regressors is quite strong, and there
is a possibility that it might not hold in this case. For example, the expro-
priation risk index is by definition not an exogenous variable, because it has
been constructed by researchers based on events and country-specific traits.
We may, for example, suspect that political shocks in previous periods affect
both expropriation risk and extraction rates in this period. Relaxing the strict
exogeneity assumption still leaves pooled OLS applicable, but only if the un-
observed heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the regressor variables. For the
sake of completeness, the estimations in section 5 will include outputs from
all three estimation methods.
Much of the literature on the resource curse is concerned with problems of
endogeneity of explanatory variables with respect to the dependent variable.
That is, x is expected to cause y, but we suspect that y may also cause x. This
is also called the simultaneity problem, and can lead to biased estimates. For
example, in Mehlum et al. (2006b) the regression of GDP growth on resource
abundance and quality of institutions, the dependent variable is likely to be
causal to the institutions variable. That is to say, we expect that as countries
grow richer, they can also afford better institutions. The simultaneity problem
can be remedied by employing an instrumental variable approach. However,
when the variable we are trying to explain is extraction rate, i.e. production
over reserves, it is not clear why there should be a simultaneity bias. We
might believe that a country that is abundant in natural resources also suffers
from low quality institutions (see Ross, 2001b, 2001a), but there is no obvious
reason for why extraction relative to reserves at the mine-level should affect
institutions. Hence I have chosen not to include an instrumental variable
estimation.6
6It should be noted that Bohn and Deacon (2000), the only empirical analysis on this
topic that is fairly similar to mine, do not mention simultaneity problems in the main
regressions.
32
5 | Empirical Analysis
The first and preliminary step of the empirical analysis was done in section
4.1.2, where iron, bituminous coal and non-bituminous coal were ranked in
terms of capital intensity. This chapter presents the results from the econo-
metric analysis. Section 5.1 presents the result from the main regressions, and
discusses the magnitude and significance of the estimated effects. Section 5.2
gives the results from various tests of robustness, and section 5.3 shows what
happens to the results when China is dropped from the sample. An alterna-
tive approach to capital intensity is empirically tested and shortly discussed
in section 5.4, and finally section 5.5 discusses some possible extensions of the
analysis.
5.1 Regression Results
Results from ordinary least squares, random effects and fixed effects regres-
sions on equation (1) are shown in table 5.1. Dummies for iron and bituminous
coal are included in the OLS and random effects regressions to account for
the possibility that extraction rates might be inherently different between the
three groups of minerals in the sample.1 Standard errors are clustered on
country-years because the expropriation risk index is common for all mines in
the same country, which might give some correlation between the residuals of
mines within a given country and year.2 The following sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2
discuss the results from the OLS and fixed effects regressions, respectively.
5.1.1 OLS Regression
From the OLS regression in table 5.1 we see that the coefficient estimates
of the three expropriation variables are all significant and of the expected
1Consult table A.5 in the appendix for a description of all variables used in the regres-
sions.
2Alternatively, clustering standard errors by mines either increases or leaves unchanged
the t-values.
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sign. The results imply that a one unit increase in the risk index is expected
to give an approximate decrease in extraction rate for non-bituminous coal
mines of 0.00977 × 100 % ≈ 1 %. For iron mines the same effect is about
1.8 %, and for bituminous coal it is close to 1.5 %.3 This indicates that the
ex ante effect is stronger than the ex post effect for all minerals, but more
so for the more capital-intensive minerals iron and bituminous coal, consis-
tent with conjectures 1–3 in section 2.5.1. As suggested by the suspected but
statistically insignificant difference in capital intensities, iron extraction rates
seem to respond more negatively than bituminous coal extraction rates. The
effects are quite large: A one standard deviation increase in expropriation risk
is associated with a 0.44 log-point—or approximately 44 %—decrease in ex-
traction rate of iron, a 37 % decrease for bituminous coal, and a 24 % decrease
for non-bituminous coal.4 This implies that in countries where the resource
sector is large relative to the rest of the economy, expropriation risk may
have severe economic consequences through the resource extraction channel.
A country with bad property rights institutions along with large endowments
of a capital-intensive natural resource is likely to be performing below its eco-
nomic potential. The model does not have very high explanatory power, with
an adjusted R2 of 0.077, most likely because there are a number of omitted
variables, notably technology and geology. Note, however, that the main focus
here is estimating the effects of expropriation risk, not attempting to explain
as much variation in extraction rates as possible.
To make the effects of expropriation risk more concrete, consider Norway
and Algeria. Both countries are minor producers of iron, but while Algeria
scores of 70 on the risk index in 2011, Norway scores 10 in the same year. If
Algeria had the property rights institutions of Norway, all other things equal,
the OLS estimation in table 5.1 implies that the average extraction rate of
iron would be 0.082 units higher, up from 0.042 to 0.122.5 Be aware, however,
that this does not imply that Norway’s iron extraction path is optimal, or that
the optimal paths for Norway and Algeria are the same. This will depend, for
example, on a society’s preferences for intergenerational equity.
Comparing the three regressions in table 5.1 we notice that the sign of the
coefficients are the same sign and similar magnitude for all variables except
3Note that the definition of extraction rate is mineral production in a given year divided
by the size of reserves in 2011, and it should thus be interpreted with some care. For
example, the extraction rate may take a value higher than 1, i.e. production may be higher
than reserves, which is of course impossible in a physical sense. However, for convenience,
I refer to this variable as the ‘extraction rate’.
4One standard deviation is about 24.5, see table 3.2 in section 3.2
5Note that because of Jensen’s inequality, ¤ ln(prodrate) ≤ ln(ÿ prodrate). To get the
correct predicted values, I apply the formula ÿ prodrate = exp( σˆ22 + ¤ ln(prodrate)). The value
of σˆ2 in the OLS regression in table 5.1 is 1.2899. See Hill, Griffiths, and Lim (2008, p. 95).
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Table 5.1: Estimation of equation (1)
Dependent variable is ln(production/reserves)
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Random effects Fixed effects
exprisk -0.00977∗∗∗ 0.00300 0.00896∗∗
(-10.24) (1.07) (2.19)
expriskiron -0.00805∗∗∗ -0.01016∗∗∗ -0.01249∗∗∗
(-3.95) (-2.74) (-2.90)
expriskbitum -0.00527∗∗∗ -0.00566∗∗ -0.00562∗
(-3.84) (-2.22) (-1.72)
iron 0.33475∗∗∗ 0.39996
(3.12) (1.17)
bituminous 0.30485∗∗∗ 0.25673
(3.27) (1.11)
lprice -0.23082∗∗∗ -0.05305 -0.00580
(-8.58) (-0.76) (-0.08)
year 0.04919∗∗∗ 0.03661∗∗∗ 0.02968∗∗∗
(7.84) (5.03) (4.38)
constant -101.02491∗∗∗ -77.06812∗∗∗ -63.39377∗∗∗
(-8.05) (-5.31) (-4.74)
N 16215 16215 16215
adj. R2 0.077 0.065
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered on 562
country-years. exprisk is the expropriation risk index; expriskiron and expriskbitum are
interactions between exprisk and dummies for iron and bituminous coal mines, respec-
tively; lprice is the log of mineral price; and year is a time trend. The sample is limited
only by missing values on production, reserves, prices and the expropriation risk variable.
The regression includes 1579 mines in 46 countries, of which 173 are iron mines, 411 are
non-bituminous coal mines and 995 are bituminous coal mines. Random and fixed effects
regressions are at the mine-level. Note that reserves are fixed over time within mines.
exprisk, lprice and year. Any bias in the coefficients of lprice and year are
not causes of concern in themselves, but the large change in the coefficient
of exprisk from the OLS and random effects estimations to the fixed effects
estimation is an indication that there is some unobserved heterogeneity which
is correlated with exprisk. A Hausman-test comparing the estimates of the
random and fixed effects regressions strongly rejects the null hypothesis of
the coefficients being the same, with a p-value of less than 0.0000, so random
effects and thus OLS estimation are likely to be inconsistent and biased. This
is, however, more interesting than it is inconvenient—I have already implied in
section 2.5.3 and 4.2.1 that cross-mine analysis should show stronger evidence
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of the ex ante effect than within-mine analysis, the reason being the time lag
of investments and persistency of expropriation risk within countries. If most
of the unobserved heterogeneity can be attributed to differences in average
investment levels in the mining sector, we should expect mines in countries
with low investments to have less production capital, and lower extraction
rates on average. Hence, I believe that the results from the pooled OLS
regression in table 5.1 give a good indication that there is a significant negative
effect of expropriation risk on extraction rates, and that this effect increases
in absolute value with capital intensity.
5.1.2 Fixed Effects Regression
While OLS should indicate the long run effects of expropriation risk, fixed
effects estimation should be an indicator of short run effects, because it con-
siders only within-mine variation. The results from the fixed effect regression
in table 5.1 indicates that expropriation risk has a positive and significant ef-
fect on non-bituminous coal extraction rates of approximately 0.9 % per unit
increase in the risk index. The interpretation is that within a specific mine,
an increase in expropriation risk from one year to the next tends to speed
up extraction, through the ex post effect. Iron extraction, however, is ex-
pected to respond negatively over time, by approximately 0.00896− 0.0125 =
−0.00354 ≈ −0.35 % per unit increase in expropriation risk. Using the no-
tation in equation (1) in section 4.2, a t-test with the null and alternative
hypotheses H0 : β1 +β2 ≥ 0 and H1 : β1 +β2 < 0 has a t-value of −1.797, less
than the left-tail critical t-value t(0.05,555) = −1.645.6 Thus we conclude that
the within-mine effect of expropriation risk on iron extraction is significantly
less than zero at the 5 % level. For bituminous coal the effect is less posi-
tive than for non-bituminous coal; the sum of the coefficients for exprisk and
expriskbitum is significantly greater than zero, with a t-value of 1.71. The
explanatory power for the fixed effect estimator is 0.065, lower than for the
OLS regression.
The results from the fixed effects regression are actually somewhat puz-
zling. I have argued that the ex ante effect is not likely to be very visible
within mines, so that the fixed effect estimates should reflect mainly the ex
post effect, but the estimates indicate otherwise. One possible explanation is
that because non-bituminous coal is not very capital-intensive, changing pro-
duction by adjusting the number of workers is relatively easy. That is to say,
extraction can quickly be increased (decreased) when there is an increase (de-
crease) in expropriation risk. For iron and bituminous coal, production might
6The standard error is se(β̂1+β̂2) =
»
var(β̂1) + var(β̂2) + 2cov(β̂1, β̂2). The respective
(co-)variances can be found in the covariance matrix in table C.1 in the appendix.
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be less sensitive to the number of workers, so quick adjustments of production
might not be as easy. The coefficients for bituminous coal are smaller than
that for non-bituminous coal, and significantly greater than zero, consistent
with this explanation. By the same argument, we would expect a positive or
no significant effect on iron extraction of a change in expropriation risk, but
the sum of coefficients for exprisk and expriskiron is significantly negative.
As we shall see in section 5.3, however, this no longer holds when Chinese
mines are dropped from the sample.
I have chosen to emphasize the results from the fixed effects and OLS
estimations, so I will only shortly comment on the random effects estimation.
The coefficients from the random effects regression are slightly different than
the OLS estimation, especially for exprisk, which is not significant at the 5 %
level. A possible explanation is that the random effects estimator puts heavier
weight on the within-mine variation more than does the OLS estimator. Since
the within-effect of exprisk is positive and the OLS coefficient is negative, the
insignificant coefficient in the random effects model may be a result of the
positive and negative effects canceling out. The coefficients for expriskiron
and expriskbitum are very similar in all three regressions, and I therefore
believe that I am not making a serious mistake by not discussing the random
effects estimation in more detail.
5.2 Robustness tests
Table 5.2 shows the results from some robustness tests on the OLS regression
in table 5.1, the results from which are repeated in regression (1) in table
5.2. Firstly, we might suspect that a country’s investment–GDP ratio could
explain some of the variation in extraction rates, for example because higher
investments give better production technology and thus higher extraction.
If investment share is correlated with the expropriation risk index, the esti-
mates in regression (1) might be biased. Adding the investment share of PPP
converted GDP from Penn World Table (Heston & Summers, 2012) to the
equation has virtually no effect on the expropriation risk coefficients or their
t-values, and the variable itself is not significant. Next, consider interactions
between the investment–GDP ratio and the iron and bituminous dummies; If
a higher investment share has an effect on extraction, this might be especially
evident for capital-intensive minerals. As expected, the interaction between
iron and the investment–GDP ratio is positive and significant. An increase
in the investment share by one percentage point is expected to increase iron
extraction rates with approximately 2.9 %. Notice, however, that the coef-
ficients of the expropriation risk variables remain significant, and are largely
unchanged except for expriskiron, which decreases slightly in absolute value.
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The last regression is based on the same variables as regression (3), but
state owned mines are dropped from the sample. We would expect that pri-
vately owned and state owned mines behave differently in the face of expro-
priation risk; that is, if the source of expropriation risk is the government, or
more generally a country’s institutions, there is no obvious reason why state
owned mines should respond to this risk at all. The results from regression
(4) shows that the exclusion of state owned mines leaves the expropriation
risk coefficients largely unchanged and highly significant. Introducing world
region fixed effects has little effect on the expropriation–mineral interaction
variables. The absolute value of exprisk is reduced, but it is still significant
at the 10 % level, so the qualitative conclusions are unchanged.
Now consider some modifications of the countries in the sample. Table
5.3 shows how the estimates change when world regions are excluded one
by one.7 Dropping Asia from the regression—which involves excluding big
producers like India and China—has virtually no effect on neither the size of
the coefficients nor their significance, but the R2 increases slightly. We reach
the same conclusions by dropping Africa, Oceania, Europe and Latin America.
However, when North America (Canada and USA) is dropped, expropriation
risk interacted with the bituminous coal dummy is no longer significant. USA
and Canada account for about 12 % of the sample mine-years for coal (table
A.1), and both have very low expropriation risk (table A.6). Other large
coal producers like Russia, China and India have substantially higher average
expropriation risk. Thus the insignificant coefficient of expriskbitum might
be a result of the loss of variation when excluding North America, and does
not necessarily reduce the strength of the conclusions. All in all, the size and
significance of the coefficients do not change very much between the regressions
in tables 5.2 and 5.3, so the results of the baseline OLS regression in table 5.1
seem fairly robust to changes in the model and the sample.
7World regions are as defined by the UN. See table A.1 for an overview of which regions
the different countries belong to.
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Table 5.2: Robustness tests
Dependent variable is ln(production/reserves)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
exprisk -0.00977∗∗∗ -0.01003∗∗∗ -0.00993∗∗∗ -0.00909∗∗∗ -0.00312∗
(-10.24) (-10.00) (-9.57) (-8.96) (-1.90)
expriskiron -0.00805∗∗∗ -0.00772∗∗∗ -0.00626∗∗∗ -0.00681∗∗∗ -0.00949∗∗∗
(-3.95) (-3.56) (-2.86) (-3.06) (-4.62)
expriskbitum -0.00527∗∗∗ -0.00547∗∗∗ -0.00544∗∗∗ -0.00582∗∗∗ -0.00521∗∗∗
(-3.84) (-3.99) (-3.62) (-4.41) (-3.84)
iron 0.33475∗∗∗ 0.30196∗∗∗ -0.46020 -0.68885∗∗ 0.44179∗∗∗
(3.12) (2.78) (-1.55) (-2.26) (4.02)
bituminous 0.30485∗∗∗ 0.31569∗∗∗ 0.40651∗∗∗ 0.84604∗∗∗ 0.31448∗∗∗
(3.27) (3.38) (3.21) (6.07) (3.49)
lprice -0.23082∗∗∗ -0.23076∗∗∗ -0.23673∗∗∗ -0.16007∗∗∗ -0.24022∗∗∗
(-8.58) (-8.87) (-9.03) (-5.58) (-9.37)
year 0.04919∗∗∗ 0.05227∗∗∗ 0.04932∗∗∗ 0.04710∗∗∗ 0.04606∗∗∗
(7.84) (7.66) (6.73) (6.29) (8.38)
ki -0.00151 -0.00150 -0.00205
(-0.44) (-0.46) (-0.59)
ironki 0.02935∗∗∗ 0.03505∗∗∗
(2.79) (3.23)
bitumki -0.00336 -0.02117∗∗∗
(-0.70) (-4.36)
constant -101.02∗∗∗ -107.14∗∗∗ -101.20∗∗∗ -96.98∗∗∗ -95.08∗∗∗
(-8.05) (-7.84) (-6.89) (-6.47) (-8.64)
N 16215 14897 14897 11915 16215
adj. R2 0.077 0.079 0.081 0.088 0.021
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) Baseline OLS regression on full sample.
(2) OLS regression with investment–GDP ratio.
(3) OLS regression with investment–GDP ratio and interactions.
(4) Same as (3), but without state owned mines.
(5) World region fixed effects.
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered on country-
years. Investment–GDP ratios, ki, were collected from Penn World Table 7.1 (Heston &
Summers, 2012). ironki and bitumki are dummies for iron and bituminous coal interacted
with the investment–GDP ratios. World regions are defined in table A.1.
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Table 5.3: Second round of robustness tests—dropping world regions
Dependent variable is ln(production/reserves)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Asia Africa Oceania Europe North Am. Latin Am.
exprisk -0.00909∗∗∗ -0.00960∗∗∗ -0.00821∗∗∗ -0.01012∗∗∗ -0.01225∗∗∗ -0.00972∗∗∗
(-5.93) (-10.26) (-8.54) (-10.00) (-8.94) (-10.19)
expriskiron -0.00958∗∗∗ -0.00660∗∗∗ -0.00734∗∗∗ -0.00737∗∗∗ -0.00728∗∗∗ -0.01071∗∗∗
(-4.00) (-3.14) (-3.48) (-3.19) (-2.73) (-5.21)
expriskbitum -0.00759∗∗∗ -0.00559∗∗∗ -0.00718∗∗∗ -0.00407∗∗∗ 0.00053 -0.00535∗∗∗
(-3.25) (-3.90) (-4.83) (-3.24) (0.32) (-3.84)
iron 0.14452 0.33273∗∗∗ 0.33005∗∗∗ 0.38551∗∗∗ 0.27607∗ 0.46520∗∗∗
(1.08) (3.11) (2.71) (3.45) (1.74) (4.31)
bituminous 0.49714∗∗∗ 0.31522∗∗∗ 0.45259∗∗∗ 0.20565∗∗ -0.08902 0.30945∗∗∗
(3.80) (3.32) (4.37) (2.16) (-0.76) (3.30)
lprice -0.27945∗∗∗ -0.25034∗∗∗ -0.24832∗∗∗ -0.16668∗∗∗ -0.23395∗∗∗ -0.23950∗∗∗
(-3.84) (-9.48) (-9.10) (-5.84) (-8.67) (-9.00)
year 0.03647∗∗∗ 0.05298∗∗∗ 0.05142∗∗∗ 0.04629∗∗∗ 0.05477∗∗∗ 0.04849∗∗∗
(4.49) (8.78) (7.94) (6.00) (8.55) (7.47)
constant -75.36∗∗∗ -108.57∗∗∗ -105.56∗∗∗ -95.37∗∗∗ -112.01∗∗∗ -99.59∗∗∗
(-4.65) (-8.99) (-8.14) (-6.18) (-8.74) (-7.66)
N 8517 15577 15032 11854 14298 15797
adj. R2 0.108 0.081 0.065 0.081 0.051 0.080
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered on country-
years. Names of the world regions are included above each regression to indicate which one
is dropped from the sample.
5.3 Dropping China from the Sample
Table A.1 in the appendix shows that almost one third of the observations
are from coal mines in China, so we might suspect that these observations are
driving the results. Estimates from the OLS, random effects and fixed effects
regressions on equation (1) when Chinese mines are dropped from the sample
are shown in table 5.4. OLS estimation gives similar results to those in table
5.1, but for the random and fixed effects models, none of the expropriation risk
variables are now significant at the 5 % level, except exprisk in the random
effects estimation.
A fixed effect estimation of equation 1 on Chinese coal mines is shown in
table C.2 in appendix C. Notice that the R2 is almost 0.29, indicating that the
fixed effects model has a lot more explanatory power for China than for the
rest of the world. The coefficient of exprisk is positive and significant at the
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10 % level, and negative but insignificant for expriskbitum. Random effects
and OLS regressions yield insignificant results.
The detrimental effect on the fixed effects estimation of dropping China
from the sample motivates a discussion of what might be going on. Expro-
priation risk in China increases from 70 to 80 in 2007, but the reason for
this change is not clear, because the authors of the index do not give details
on the rationale for changes in each case. Actually, China passed a law in
2007 designed to increase protection of private property (Kahn, 2007), so we
would have expected expropriation risk to decrease in that year, not increase.
Another puzzling fact is that most, if not all Chinese mines in the sample are
owned by the state, at different levels of government (province, municipality,
county and city), either directly or indirectly. Thus there is no obvious reason
for why coal extraction should be higher when expropriation risk increases.
Table 5.4: Estimation of equation (1) without China
Dependent variable is ln(production/reserves)
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Random effects Fixed effects
exprisk -0.01075∗∗∗ -0.00545∗∗∗ -0.00234
(-8.32) (-2.89) (-1.28)
expriskiron -0.00668∗∗∗ 0.00082 0.00139
(-3.03) (0.29) (0.56)
expriskbitum -0.00666∗∗∗ -0.00000 0.00249
(-3.10) (-0.00) (0.92)
iron 0.20216 -0.44837∗∗
(1.59) (-2.03)
bituminous 0.28862∗∗ -0.27608∗
(2.34) (-1.86)
lprice -0.18884∗∗∗ 0.05288 0.08413
(-2.97) (1.02) (1.60)
year 0.03467∗∗∗ 0.01917∗∗∗ 0.01489∗∗∗
(4.72) (4.98) (3.69)
constant -71.97292∗∗∗ -41.77133∗∗∗ -33.72382∗∗∗
(-4.91) (-5.50) (-4.24)
N 11718 11718 11718
adj. R2 0.090 0.023
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered on 550
country-years. All mines in China were dropped from the estimations.
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A part of the explanation for these results might be that production data
from 2008–2011 is of questionable quality—almost all of the data in these
years has been estimated by IntierraRMG rather than reported by the mining
companies. This period approximately coincides with the period when expro-
priation risk is higher, and it is hard to determine how accurate the estimated
data are. However, recall that the results from the fixed effects regression
in table 5.1 were actually somewhat puzzling, because it seemed that the ex
ante effect was unexpectedly present in the short run within mines. That is
to say, the non-existing effects we get when China is dropped is not entirely
unexpected, and might be an indication that the initial results were spurious.
Regression on a fixed effects model for China in the years 2000–2007 (not
shown), i.e. excluding the estimated production data, leaves expropriation
risk insignificant at any reasonable level of significance.
China is an enormous country, arguably with substantial heterogeneity
across regions, and it may thus be deserving of a dedicated study. From
these results, however, it seems like the effect of expropriation risk on mineral
extraction is in general difficult to capture by a fixed effects model: (i) The
average within-country variation of expropriation risk is very small; (ii) long
run effects are difficult to observe within mines; (iii) even though ex post
effects can appear in the short run, coal and iron production might take time
to adjust.
5.4 Revisited: Determining Capital Intensities
The main strategy for determining capital intensity, described in section 4.1,
involves comparing average investment–output ratios. One advantage of this
approach is its general nature—it can be applied to different minerals, enabling
comparison of capital intensities. An alternative, not so general approach
is to differentiate with respect to production methods for specific minerals.
This section shortly discusses an attempt at this, which seems to give results
consistent with those in section 5.1.1.
A publication from the World Coal Institute (2005) indicates that the room
& pillar method of coal mining requires a lot less investment in machinery
relative to production than does the longwall method.8 The choice between
the two methods is largely dictated by geology and other properties of the
coal deposit, so they are not perfect substitutes. This implies that we would
expect the investment depressing effect of expropriation risk to have a larger
8The investment–output ratio approach in section 4.1.2 is not conclusive in this case,
because there are too few observations of longwall and room & pillar mining with non-zero
values on the ‘project cost’ variable.
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negative impact on mining from deposits that require longwall mining.
Table 5.5 shows the results from an OLS regression on a sample that in-
cludes only mines that are reported to employ either the room & pillar or
longwall method of coal mining. The effect of capital intensity is captured by
creating a dummy for longwall mining and interacting it with the expropria-
tion risk index. Expropriation risk has a small negative and insignificant coef-
ficient, but the interaction variable exprisklongwall is negative and significant
at the 1 % level. This indicates that while expropriation risk has no apparent
effect on coal extraction in mines that employ the less capital-intensive room
& pillar method, it has a strong negative effect on coal extraction in mines
that use the relatively more capital-intensive longwall method, consistent with
the overall results from the OLS regressions in previous sections.
Table 5.5: Room & pillar and longwall mining
ln(production/reserves)
exprisk -0.0026 (-0.73)
exprisklongwall -0.0134∗∗∗ (-3.69)
longwall 0.5819∗∗∗ (5.62)
lprice -0.3089∗∗∗ (-9.74)
year 0.0647∗∗∗ (8.07)
constant -132.01∗∗∗ (-8.19)
N 6302
adj. R2 0.086
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust
standard errors clustered on 224 country-years.
5.5 Extensions and Further Research
The results from the empirical part of this thesis are definitely interesting
in themselves, but they also give motivation for further research, for example
because the models have low explanatory power. There are a number of direct
extensions and modifications of the empirical analysis that could give more
detailed insight into the mechanisms at work. This section provides a brief
presentation of four possible extensions of the analysis in this thesis, as well
as one more related to the paper by Bohn and Deacon (2000).
The first possible extension could be to examine whether environmental
regulations of the mining sector affect extraction decisions. We might suspect
that there is less political pressure for environmental issues in less developed
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countries, which also tend to have higher expropriation risk. The produc-
ers cost of regulations is likely to vary between minerals, because the waste
from the mining process will vary. Coal, for example, has been shown to
have a large detrimental effect on the environment (Rathore & Wright, 1993;
Tiwary, 2001; Younger, 2004). If regulations on coal mining increases the
marginal cost of extraction, theory predicts that extraction will be slower9.
Isolating this effect, we would expect coal extraction to be more rapid in less
developed and less regulated economies. Thus the effect of expropriation risk
on extraction in the OLS regression in table 5.4 might be an underestimation,
but this will of course depend on the correlation between expropriation risk
and environmental regulation.
We could also imagine an extension by simply including more minerals in
the analysis. Ideally, minerals would be ordered in terms of capital intensity,
which would make us able to provide better evidence of the proposed causality.
Moreover, some minerals are probably more exposed to expropriation than
others. This thesis has examined coal and iron specifically, but mostly because
of analytical convenience. Minerals like oil, gold and diamonds have through
history been especially associated with conflict and expropriation (Harsch,
2007), so we may expect an analysis on these minerals to show even stronger
effects. Notice also from figures B.1 and B.2, showing the distributions of coal
and iron mines across countries, that neither of these minerals are found in
great amounts in Africa or South America, two continents that historically
have seen the lion’s share of conflict over natural resources. Therefore, it
might be interesting to do an analysis on minerals that are more common in
these regions, in which many countries exhibit high levels of expropriation risk
(see table A.6).
Another extension could involve categorizing mines by state, domestic and
foreign ownership. Firstly, if expropriation risk comes from the authorities, we
might expect state owned mines to be fairly unresponsive to risk. Secondly,
we may believe that foreign companies are more frequently targeted than are
domestically owned companies. Thirdly, one could examine the effects on
state owned mines of risk from other sources than the government.
This thesis is concerned mainly with formal property rights institutions, as
defined by the property rights variable from the Index of Economic Freedom
(The Heritage Foundation, 2013). An obvious test of robustness would be
to check whether we get the same results with other property rights indices.
Moreover, we would expect that there are a number of other variables that
also affect mineral extraction, notably armed conflict. One could for exam-
ple combine mineral extraction data with the Georeferenced Event Dataset
9This is the opposite effect of capital investments, which decreases the marginal cost of
extraction and speeds up extraction. Confer section 2.5.1.
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(GED) from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program10 with GPS information on
individual mines. This would allow for an investigation of effects of owner-
ship risk that does not respect national borders or is very local. The UCDP
dataset also has information about whether conflict is state-based, non-state
or one-sided, effects of which could be suspected to vary depending on mine
ownership.
Although the theory and empirical results in Bohn and Deacon (2000) are
convincing, there may be other explanations for an observed negative effect
of expropriation risk on extraction rates. One such explanation is given by
Laurent-Lucchetti and Santugini (2012), who claim that (i) the mineral sector
usually consists of only a few firms, and (ii) recent expropriations only affected
a single firm. From this outset they construct a game theoretic framework with
two firms, which have an agreement with the government of extracting from
a common-pool resource. A typical example would be large oil fields where a
few firms compete to extract from the same “pool” of reserves. The exogenous
expropriation risk is known by both firms, but they do not know, ex ante, the
identity of the to-be excluded firm. Both firms have an expected value that
comprises both the loss in the event of expropriation and the gain from ending
up as the only extracting firm, should the other firm be expropriated. This
gain is a result of the alleviation of the externality caused by multiple firms
exploiting a common-pool resource, known as the tragedy of the commons.
The total effect of the expropriation risk ultimately depends on the elasticity of
demand, i.e. how strong the tragedy of the commons is (see e.g. Koulovatianos
& Mirman, 2007). If the expected gain outweighs the expected loss, extraction
rates will go down, because of increased incentives for long-run management of
the resource. This theory implies that Bohn and Deacon’s (2000) results in the
oil production estimation may not only be driven by capital intensity, which
could be tested empirically by comparing offshore and onshore oil production,
which likely have different average sunk costs, but should be similar with
respect to Laurent-Lucchetti and Santugini’s assumptions.11
10See http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/.
11This difference in cost structures leads Bohn and Deacon (2000) to exclude offshore
fields from the sample.
45
6 | Conclusion
This thesis has been concerned with how risk of expropriation affects the deci-
sions of mine owners, specifically whether mineral extraction rates are affected
positively or negatively by this risk. Although the theoretical literature is not
unanimous in its predictions, most papers argue that the direction of the ef-
fects is related to the need for investments in exploration and mining capital
(Olsen, 1987; Farzin, 1984; Lasserre, 1982; Peterson, 1978; Bohn & Deacon,
2000). Bohn and Deacon (2000) provide evidence of a negative effect if capital
intensity is high enough; however, the evidence for resources with low capital
intensity is less compelling. I have argued that we should test the theory
on resources that are similar in most aspects, but differ in terms of capital
intensity.
Comparisons of investment–output ratios show that iron and bituminous
coal are both significantly more capital-intensive than non-bituminous coal,
and that iron is likely also more capital-intensive than bituminous coal. Re-
sults from pooled OLS regressions indicate that the effect of expropriation
risk on extraction rates is negative for all minerals, but more strongly neg-
ative for iron and bituminous coal. Depending on model specification, iron
extraction is also more negatively affected by risk than is bituminous coal ex-
traction. The effects are large, implying substantial economic consequences of
expropriation risk, through its impact on natural resource exploitation. OLS
regressions most likely capture the long run effects of expropriation risk, be-
cause institutions tend to be persistent within countries, and investments take
time to materialize. Fixed effects regressions give some evidence of a positive
short run effect of risk on coal extraction, but the results are not robust to
changes in the sample, and seem very much driven by Chinese mines.
To the best of my knowledge, this thesis is the first attempt to use cross-
country data to empirically examine the effects of property rights institu-
tions on non-fluent mineral extraction. Extensions, modifications and new
approaches may be appropriate for deeper investigation into the matter at
hand. I nevertheless believe that my analysis, though perhaps somewhat pre-
liminary, represents an original and independent contribution to the empirical
literature on the subject.
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Table A.1: Mine-years in sample by country
Sample Iron mines Coal mines
Country World region No. Pct. No. Pct. No. Pct.
Algeria Africa 33 0.20 33 1.55
Argentina Latin Am. 6 0.04 6 0.04
Australia Oceania 1087 6.70 216 10.16 871 6.18
Austria Europe 17 0.10 17 0.80
Bangladesh Asia 1 0.01 1 0.01
Botswana Africa 12 0.07 12 0.09
Brazil Latin Am. 133 0.82 128 6.02 5 0.04
Canada North Am. 275 1.70 53 2.49 222 1.58
Chile Latin Am. 58 0.36 58 2.73
China Asia 4497 27.73 4 0.19 4493 31.89
Colombia Latin Am. 53 0.33 53 0.38
Czech Rep. Europe 78 0.48 78 0.55
Egypt Africa 22 0.14 17 0.80 5 0.04
Germany Europe 3 0.02 3 0.02
Greece Europe 60 0.37 60 0.43
Hungary Europe 25 0.15 25 0.18
India Asia 2581 15.92 697 32.80 1884 13.37
Indonesia Asia 226 1.39 226 1.60
Iran Asia 74 0.46 74 3.48
Kazakhstan Asia 76 0.47 24 1.13 52 0.37
Liberia Africa 1 0.01 1 0.05
Mauritania Africa 32 0.20 32 1.51
Mexico Latin Am. 82 0.51 58 2.73 24 0.17
Mongolia Asia 45 0.28 45 0.32
Mozambique Africa 1 0.01 1 0.01
New Zealand Oceania 96 0.59 32 1.51 64 0.45
Niger Africa 6 0.04 6 0.04
Norway Europe 61 0.38 25 1.18 36 0.26
Peru Latin Am. 17 0.10 17 0.80
Philippines Asia 10 0.06 10 0.07
Poland Europe 454 2.80 454 3.22
Romania Europe 132 0.81 132 0.94
Russia Europe 2517 15.52 225 10.59 2292 16.27
Serbia Europe 4 0.02 4 0.03
South Africa Africa 503 3.10 56 2.64 447 3.17
Swaziland Africa 12 0.07 12 0.09
Sweden Europe 34 0.21 34 1.60
Thailand Asia 10 0.06 10 0.07
Tunisia Africa 4 0.02 4 0.19
Turkey Asia 177 1.09 37 1.74 140 0.99
UK Europe 74 0.46 74 0.53
USA North Am. 1642 10.13 137 6.45 1505 10.68
Ukraine Europe 902 5.56 96 4.52 806 5.72
Uzbekistan Asia 1 0.01 1 0.01
Venezuela Latin Am. 69 0.43 50 2.35 19 0.13
Zimbabwe Africa 12 0.07 12 0.09
Total 16215 100 2125 100 14090 100
Notes: Source: IntierraRMG Raw Materials Data. Table gives the distribution of the total number of
observations in the sample..
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Table A.2: Mineral statistics by country
Non-bituminous coal Bituminous coal Iron
Country Prod. Prodrate Reserves Prod. Prodrate Reserves Prod. Prodrate Reserves
Algeria 1.7 .0033 2004
Argentina .15 .0002 750
Australia 44 .12 1171 292 .13 11678 242 .18 6368
Austria 1.9 .019 100
Bangladesh .1 .0014 70
Botswana .88 .00017 5080
Brazil .98 .024 40 167 .038 13715
Canada 36 .26 747 33 .12 1202 37 .03 1936
Chile 9.9 .034 677
China 422 .082 35991 525 .039 36612 1.9 .0032 612
Colombia 61 .043 2649
Czech Rep. 39 .17 735 11 .059 195
Egypt .34 .017 20 2.2 .028 78
Germany 36 .027 1300
Greece 64 .016 7755
Hungary 7.1 .19 633
India 86 .06 2933 256 .022 13740 116 .059 4779
Indonesia 87 .041 4189 44 .075 826
Iran 15 .012 1684
Kazakhstan 4.2 .024 177 70 .022 3982 1.6 .021 2806
Liberia 1.3 .093 14
Mauritania 7.3 .012 750
Mexico 4.9 .05 99 4 .018 219 8.3 .1 305
Mongolia 5.1 .0077 950 3.7 .0098 334
Mozambique .62 .00065 952
New Zealand 2.3 .14 19 2.2 .19 26 2.2 .0091 288
Niger .17 .034 5
Norway 2.5 .1 16 1.7 .007 517
Peru 6.2 .021 300
Philippines 3.9 .042 93
Poland 60 .066 1309 94 .03 4962
Romania 31 .13 635
Russia 75 .1 7449 227 .095 15099 81 .014 25957
Serbia 7 .25 30
South Africa 4.6 .058 159 218 .12 7032 43 .072 1765
Swaziland .35 .1 3.5
Sweden 22 .024 945
Thailand .51 .64 .79
Tunisia .09 .0018 50
Turkey 28 .029 1509 2.2 .0042 1016 .62 .055 17
UK .13 .025 5.3 9 .27 64
USA 438 .092 11196 281 .1 5987 52 .11 2011
Ukraine 7.8 .015 624 62 .017 4770 43 .017 3417
Uzbekistan .085 .000085 1000
Venezuela 6 .026 208 18 .045 667
Zimbabwe 2.4 .017 141
Total 1494 .089 80463 2208 .066 117924 883 .061 71763
Notes: Source: IntierraRMG Raw Materials Data. ‘Prod.’ is the accumulated country production over all
years in the sample, ‘Prodrate’ is the average extraction rate, and ‘Reserves’ is the sum of reserves over all
mines in the sample.
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Table A.3: Distribution of coal ranks
Dataset Sample
Coal rank Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Not specified 896 33.51 88 6.26
Anthracite 134 5.01
Anthracite, Bituminous 14 0.52
Bituminous 1,242 46.45 995 70.77
Bituminous, Anthracite 3 0.11
Bituminous, Lignite 3 0.11
Bituminous, Sub-Bituminous 1 0.04
Lignite 189 7.07 151 10.74
Lignite, Sub-Bituminous 1 0.04
Sub-Bituminous 182 6.81 172 12.23
Sub-Bituminous, Bituminous 1 0.04
Sub-Bituminous, Lignite 8 0.30
Total 2,674 100.00 1,406 100.00
Source: Raw Materials Data
Table A.4: Commodity prices, USD per metric tonne
Year Bituminous Sub-bitum. Lignite Iron
1995 35.50
1996 35.98
1997 36.38
1998 37.38
1999 31.42
2000 27.22 8.02 12.86 29.26
2001 27.95 7.35 12.70 27.02
2002 28.82 7.96 12.01 28.12
2003 28.40 8.21 11.90 32.91
2004 31.57 8.39 12.68 38.05
2005 36.80 8.68 13.49 43.80
2006 38.09 9.64 13.56 52.12
2007 38.41 10.06 14.02 55.95
2008 47.33 11.34 15.20 67.76
2009 50.52 12.17 15.73 85.20
2010 54.85 12.71 16.90 87.72
2011 50.85 13.94 17.10 87.89
Source: USGS and US Energy Information Administration
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Table A.5: Variable definitions and sources
Variable Source Definition Unit/range
production RMD Annual production of iron ore concentrate and run-of-mine coal Million tonnes
reserves RMD Sum of proven and probable ore reserves Million tonnes
lprodrate RMD ln(production/reserves)
projectcost RMD Actual or estimated cost of current or recent project Million USD
iron RMD Dummy for iron mines {0, 1}
bituminous RMD Dummy for bituminous coal mines {0, 1}
longwall RMD Dummy for longwall coal mining {0, 1}
exprisk IEF Expropriation risk index, 100−‘property rights’ [0, 100]
expriskiron IEF/RMD Expropriation risk interacted with iron dummy [0, 100]
expriskbitum IEF/RMD Expropriation risk interacted with bituminous dummy [0, 100]
exprisklongwall IEF/RMD Expropriation risk interacted with longwall dummy [0, 100]
ki PENN Investment share of PPP converted GDP per capita, 2005 USD Percent
ironki PENN/RMD Investment share interacted with the dummy for iron mines Percent
bitumki PENN/RMD Investment share interacted with the dummy for bituminous coal mines Percent
lprice USGS/USEIA Log of average annual coal/iron price USD per tonne
RMD: Raw Materials Data. Copyright: IntierraRMG, Stockholm, 2013.
IEF: Heritage Foundation 2013 Index of Economic Freedom.
PENN: Penn World Tables 7.1, November 2012.
USGS: US Geological Survey Historical Statistics for Mineral and Material Commodities in the United States.
USEIA: US Energy Information Administration.
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Table A.6: Countries in sample sorted by mean exprisk
Country Mean Std.dev.
Iran 90.00 0.00
Zimbabwe 89.58 6.56
China 74.36 4.96
Mauritania 70.94 1.98
Venezuela 70.00 16.36
Kazakhstan 70.00 2.31
Bangladesh 70.00 0.00
Liberia 70.00 0.00
Mozambique 70.00 0.00
Niger 70.00 0.00
Serbia 70.00 0.00
Uzbekistan 70.00 0.00
Ukraine 69.89 1.49
Indonesia 68.67 4.99
Romania 67.92 3.81
Russia 67.89 8.09
Philippines 66.00 8.43
Algeria 63.94 9.33
Mongolia 61.11 10.05
Colombia 60.19 8.88
Peru 57.65 10.91
Argentina 56.67 16.33
Egypt 53.18 5.68
Brazil 50.00 0.00
India 50.00 0.00
South Africa 50.00 0.00
Tunisia 50.00 0.00
Mexico 49.51 3.10
Turkey 48.87 4.63
Swaziland 47.92 8.91
Greece 45.83 7.66
Poland 42.04 9.10
Thailand 42.00 10.33
Czech Republic 31.15 2.12
Hungary 30.40 1.38
Botswana 29.58 1.44
Sweden 16.76 9.99
Chile 10.86 1.91
USA 10.81 1.85
UK 10.68 1.72
Australia 10.00 0.00
Austria 10.00 0.00
Canada 10.00 0.00
Germany 10.00 0.00
Norway 10.00 0.00
New Zealand 8.80 2.15
Total 53.06 24.49
Source: Heritage Foundation IEF
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B | Figures
59
Figure B.1: 2011 Coal production.
Source: Raw Materials Data. Copyright: IntierraRMG, Stockholm, 2013
Notes: Map shows production, reflected by the size of the green bubbles, of all coal mines in the dataset, not only those in the sample.
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Figure B.2: 2011 Iron production
Source: Raw Materials Data. Copyright: IntierraRMG, Stockholm, 2013
Notes: Map shows production, reflected by the size of the green bubbles, of all iron mines in the dataset, not only those in the sample.
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C | Regression-related tables
Table C.1: Covariance matrix from the fixed effects regression in table 5.1
exprisk expriskiron expriskbitum year lprice constant
exprisk .00001668
expriskiron -.00001571 .00001862
expriskbitum -.00001177 .00001178 .00001069
year -1.222e-06 -3.922e-06 -4.883e-07 .00004597
lprice -1.356e-06 .00001996 -3.499e-06 -.00040383 .00479082
constant .00203377 .0081525 .0012108 -.09073767 .79384079 179.11083
Notes: Table shows covariances between regression coefficients.
Table C.2: Fixed effects regression, Chinese mines
(1)
ln(production/reserves)
exprisk 0.00717∗ (1.70)
expriskbitum -0.00585 (-1.10)
lprice -0.28348∗∗∗ (-2.78)
year 0.07721∗∗∗ (10.82)
constant -158.042∗∗∗ (-11.27)
N 4497
adj. R2 0.289
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, robust standard errors,
clustered on mines.
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Table C.3: Robustness tests of fixed effects regressions
Dependent variable is ln(production/reserves)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
exprisk 0.00896∗∗ 0.00919∗∗ 0.00891∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0128∗∗∗
(2.19) (2.11) (1.91) (3.56) (3.50)
expriskiron -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗ -0.0114∗∗ -0.0172∗∗∗ -0.0182∗∗∗
(-2.90) (-2.92) (-2.53) (-4.25) (-4.55)
expriskbitum -0.00562∗ -0.00554∗ -0.00457 -0.00421∗ -0.00426∗
(-1.72) (-1.74) (-1.38) (-1.68) (-1.76)
lprice -0.00580 -0.00510 -0.0134 0.116 0.0751
(-0.08) (-0.07) (-0.19) (1.47) (1.00)
year 0.0297∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗ 0.0301∗∗∗ 0.0135 0.0154∗
(4.38) (4.36) (3.91) (1.51) (1.77)
expriskstate -0.00112 -0.00208 -0.00285 -0.00277
(-0.46) (-0.84) (-1.05) (-1.02)
ki 0.00429 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.00837∗
(0.97) (3.37) (1.92)
ironki 0.0116∗∗
(2.07)
L.exprisk 0.00197 0.00254
(0.95) (1.23)
L2.exprisk -0.00165 -0.00148
(-0.87) (-0.77)
L3.exprisk 0.00135 0.00152
(0.92) (1.01)
L4.exprisk -0.00254 -0.00224
(-1.51) (-1.37)
constant -63.39∗∗∗ -63.36∗∗∗ -64.37∗∗∗ -31.87∗ -35.45∗∗
(-4.74) (-4.72) (-4.24) (-1.80) (-2.06)
N 16215 16215 14897 10197 10197
adj. R2 0.065 0.065 0.063 0.043 0.044
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors are robust and clustered on country-
years. expriskstate is an interaction between a dummy for state owned mines and exprisk,
ki is the investment share of GDP from Penn World Table 7.1, L.exprisk, L2.exprisk etc.,
are lags of exprisk, and ironki is an interaction between ki and a dummy for iron mines.
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D | Proofs
D.1 Extraction rate with and without risk1
Consider the case of a non-capital-intensive mineral.2 We have two continuous,
differentiable functions, g(t) and f(t), defined on t ∈ [0,∞) such that:
g(0) > f(0) (3)
g′(t) < f ′(t) < 0 (4)
∃ t¯ such that g(t) ≥ f(t) for t ≤ t¯ and g(t) < f(t) for t > t¯ (5)
G(t′) =
∫ ∞
t′
g(t)dt and F (t′) =
∫ ∞
t′
f(t)dt (6)
G(0) = F (0) = C > 0 (7)
g(t) is the extraction path under risk and f(t) is the path with no risk.
Note that F (t′) > G(t′) for t′ > 0. I need to prove that the extraction rate
will always be larger under risk. That is, I need to prove that
g(t′)
G(t′)
>
f(t′)
F (t′)
for all t′ < T (8)
where T is defined by g(T ) = G(T ) = 0, assuming that it exists. If T does
not exist, we have F (t′) > G(t′) > 0, ∀ t ∈ [0,∞). Notice that (7) obviously
holds for t′ < t¯.
Define h(t′) = g(t′)F (t′)− f(t′)G(t′), which is continuous because f and g
are continuous. We have h(0) = [g(0)− f(0)]C > 0. Claim is proved when I
can show that h′(t′) > 0 for all t′ ∈ (0, T ).
1I am indebted to Florian Diekert for this proof.
2The proof for the case of a capital-intensive mineral is symmetrical.
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Proof by contradiction: Suppose that there is some t′ such that h′(t′) = 0.
Then we have (suppressing t′):
h′ = g′F + gf − f ′G− fg = 0
m
g′F = f ′G
m
g′
f ′
=
G
F
This is a contradiction since the left-hand side is larger than 1, and the
right-hand side is smaller than 1 for all t ∈ (0, T ). Because h is continuous,
this contradiction also excludes the possibility h′(t′) < 0, Q.E.D.
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